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CORRESPONDENCE
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY URR.llr?I F.S
To the Editor of The Cressef:
In "The Case for Aid to the Contras" (April, 1986), the editor

opines that the government of the
United States should supply $100
million in aid to the contra rebels
fighting against the government of
Nicaragua. This argument is based
on the idea that it is in the "national interest" of the United
States. I have always been mystified
by this term.
First, it assumes that every citizen
of the United States has the same
national interest, an interest which
is defined by whoever controls the
reins of government. Second, is it
truly in our long term interest to
help overthrow an elected government? I do say elected in an election dubbed at least as fair as that
of El Salvador by a conservative
British politician. It can hardly be
in our national interest to antagonize other Latin American
countries, as well as countries of
Europe, by not obeying international law, namely the Geneva Convention.
The Administration's loose handling of facts about Nicaragua being
the training center for guerilla
movements-for example, Braziland its disregard of advice from
many Latin American countries
about aid can only deepen the suspicions that have existed in Latin
America over the past 125 years.
The recently elected government of
Guatemala, still under pressure
from its own military ... does not
favor renewed aid to the contras.
Some reputable observers, including members of the U.S. press
corps in private conversations, feel
that Nicaragua is one of the few
Central American countries to address the significant problems of
health, education, and land reform
in a serious way. The contras do not
pretend to have policies which will
September, 1986

solve these pressing problems.
I am not arguing that the Sandinista government is saintly, but
am arguing that the gross disinformation campaign aimed against
Nicaragua does not serve to make
rational decisions about U.S. policy
possible. The right to nonintervention in the internal affairs of a
sovereign country is not even discussed by the Administration nor
most of its Congressional opponents.
The tone of debate about Nicaragua has reached levels such that
factual knowledge about developments there is hard to obtain.
Richard Hansis
Valparaiso, Indiana
To the Editor of The Cressef:

. . . Your editorial in favor of
contra aid demonstrates again how

reality can be denied in order to
support governing elites and powerful hierarchies over popular
movements for self-government.
Your vocabulary, for example, is
vague and misapplied. The lax use
of terms like "communist" and
"Marxist-Leninist" renders them
definitionless. In what sense can a
revolution in a virtually undeveloped, agricultural society be
called Marxist? More importantly,
the tendency to "totalitarianism" is
not reserved to governments of the
Left. Even with Marcos and Duvalier gone, examples abound:
Chun in South Korea, Pinochet in
Chile, Mobutu in Zaire, Stroessner
in Paraguay, Botha in South Africa,
Zia in Pakistan . . .
The analogy between the Philippines and Haiti on the one hand
and Nicaragua on the other could
be telling if it were properly
applied. All three societies experience a sharp division between
popular, Christian base communities opposed to the govern-

ment and a Roman Catholic hierarchy supporting the status quo. Only
when Cardinal Sin in Manila and
the bishops in Haiti moved to support the long-standing popular
movements did the dictators fall. (I
might add that Marcos fell even
while he retained the support of
Reagan.) In Nicaragua, sharp confrontations
between
Cardinal
Obando y Bravo and the popular
church have become especially vehement; the Cardinal has tacitly supported contra activities and ignored
the suffering in the countryside.
I defend the principle of non-intervention and its consistent application by the Left. The principle
seeks no intervention to promote an
alternative not freely chosen by the
people concerned. The Left seeks
an end to U.S. financial and diplomatic intervention to support
state racism in southern Africa.
The Left seeks an end to U.S. military support for Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, South Korea,
and Chile, and for the South African-backed UNITA forces.
I will also defend the Nicaraguans' fear of being encircled by
hostile forces-it is objectively true.
The U.S. has created a military
force in Honduras, has fostered division between the Managua government and Atlantic-coast Indians,
and is now also militarizing oncepacifist Costa Rica. My map shows
that to
pretty well encircle
Nicaragua . . . .
Your use of the phrase "our backyard" exemplifies the social Darwmlsm and institutional racism
which is favored on the Right these
days. The Caribbean and Central
America are not possessions of the
U.S. Nicaragua, with a population
of 3 million and a territory the size
of Pennsylvania, poses no military
threat to the U.S. What Nicaragua
does pose is a threat to the U.S.centered capitalist world order.
The Sandinistas have offered a
working alternative to Western
capitalism-and to Soviet state
socialism-that the U.S. system
can't permit. It's very similar to the
U.S.'s inability to accept New Zea-
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land's non-nuclear alternative.
Finally, I don't know how El Salvador has "turned out better than
almost anyone expected." Clearly,
you have overlooked the reports by
peasants of the U.S.-supplied helicopters' air war on the countryside
of El Salvador. Thousands continue
to die as a result of this military
aid. You must also have missed the
reports of harassment, arrest, torture, and even murder of Lutheran
pastors in El Salvador by government death squads. I hope fervently that the same will not turn
out to be true for Nicaragua.
David Barlett
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
James Nuechterlein responds:

In the editorial in question, I
wrote that while support for the
contras could not be offered with
"great enthusiasm," neither did it
require "a lot of agonizing." In the
intervening five months, I have
changed my mind about the agonizing, but not, finally, about the
support. I have not the space here
fully to respond to my critics, but I
do want once more to explain
briefly why, on balance, aid to the
contras seems to me to be justified.
The strongest case against aid
rests with the problematic nature of
the anti-Sandinista movement. Its
cause seems to me fully legitimate,
but its ranks include too many Somocistas, too many former National
Guardsmen, too many thugs and
opportunists. It engages in acts of
terrorism against civilians that are
morally repugnant and that are,
moreover, counter-productive m
political terms.
Revolutions and counter-revolutions do not occur without casualties, often innocent ones, but it is
morally necessary that those who
engage in them be held accountable for gratuitous violations of
human rights. If it is unrealistic to
demand moral fastidiousness m
conditions of civil war, it is re4

quired of all of us-on both Left
and Right-that we not lie about
what is happening and that we not
excuse the intolerable out of
ideological convenience. The U.S.
must insist as a condition of aid
that the contras conform their behavior to civilized standards. If
they do not make continuing progress in that direction, then aid
should be terminated.
I am willing in the meantime to
support aid because I believe that
the case against the Sandinistas is
so overwhelming. This is a repressive regime, entirely indifferent to
political, religious, and civil rights,
and the direction of its policy is toward more repression, not less (see,
for example, the report by Nina H.
Shea in the September 1 issue of
the New R epublic). The Sandinistas
are also making an increasing shambles of the Nicaraguan economy.
The combination of repression
and incompetence has created an
ever more broadly-based political
opposition. What was once a
genuine popular revolution has degenerated into an inept semityranny. (Incidentally, Mr. Hansis'
view of the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan elections is not one shared
by most dispassionate observers,
such as Robert Leiken of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.) The Sandinistas are not
without their achievements, but it is
difficult to believe that gains in
education or health care can only
come at the price of democracy
and human rights.
Many critics (though not my correspondents) concede the Sandinistas' faults , but go on to argue that
the U.S. should nonetheless leave
them to their own devices. Yet that
would mean the entrenchment of a
Marxist-Leninist regime (Mr. Barlett astonishingly denies what the
Sandinistas acknowledge) that is a
threat to its neighbors (it requires a
certain inventiveness to see Nicaragoa endangered by an encircling

Costa Rica) and whose opposttlon
to the U.S. is so fundamental that
it has been embedded in the national anthem. Direct American
military involvement would, in my
view, be a great mistake, but aid to
the contras-an indigenous and inclusive opposition-falls considerably short of that.
The idea of the "national interest" does not seem all that mystifying to me as it applies to this
situation. Since Marxist governments oppose the U.S. (regardless
of who currently occupies the
White House), and since the Sandinistas constitute such a government, it seems clear enough that it
is in the American national interest
to oppose the Sandinistas, who
have not only made apparent their
intimate association with the Soviet
Union and Cuba but who have
talked openly of their movement as
a "revolution without frontiers."
To insist that the U.S. must not
intervene in a situation so close to
its own borders when the U .S.S.R.
has made so massive an intervention-over $500 million in military
aid in five years-strikes me as
strategically naive and analytically
bizarre. As for a diplomatic solution, the Contadora process has
been notable so far only for its ineffectuality. Does anyone truly believe that in the absence of pressure from the contras there would
be any possibility of steering the
Sandinistas toward restraint in their
neighborhood or openness to democracy and pluralism at home ? In
this case, diplomacy and military
pressure can work together.
The situation in Nicaragua is ambiguous and messy, and none of
America's policy options is all that
attractive. But a program of limited
aid to the rebels seems preferable
to a policy of noninvolvement that
would work only to the detriment
of freedom in Nicaragua, stability
in Central America, and advancement of American interests.
Cl
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IN LUCE TUA
C omment on C ontemporary Affairs by the Editor
Father Curran & the Problem of Truth
It is especially appropriate at the beginning of the
academic year of a Christian university to consider
some tangential implications of the case of the Reverend Charles E. Curran. Father Curran, a distinguished
teacher and scholar at the Catholic University of
America, has been removed by the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith from his position as a Catholic theologian. The case of Father Curran raises in a particular instance the general problem
of the relationship between the conflicting claims of
Christian orthodoxy and the free intellectual life of
the university. Few if any of us in non-Catholic universities face the dilemmas of that relationship in so immediate a manner as Father Curran-especially if we
do not teach theology-but the intellectual tensions
that lie behind those dilemmas require the continued
attention of all of us committed to both the life of the
mind and the life of faith.
Most of those in university circles who owe no fealty
to Rome will likely sympathize with Father Curran because of their instinctive support for academic freedom. In defending his rights they will be shoring up
their own, and they will have a strong-we think persuasive--case for doing so. But in arguing for Curran
they might want to draw as precisely as possible the
lines of their disagreement with Rome.
One can argue with the Catholic church's exercise of
discipline in this case without necessarily questioning
the legitimacy of its disciplinary authority. Father Curran has disagreed openly with official teachings of his
church on matters involving divorce, contraception,
abortion, and extramarital sex, but his disagreements
have generally come at the margins rather than at the
heart of Catholic teaching. He tends, so far as we can
see, to argue more that the church should be flexible
in hard cases rather than that it should reverse its essential doctrines. There is a good case to be made for
leniency in judging such deviations. An orthodoxy that
defines itself too extensively, that guards not just the
essential core of doctrine but its every extension, is
one that few thoughtful Christians can live with without considerable reservation.
But a quarrel with Rome as to its practice in any
given case is far removed from denial of its right to
define, preserve, and defend its magisterium (teaching
authority). More than that-and central to the argument here-it is not at all to deny the assumptions that
undergird the magisterium itself: that there exist au-
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thoritative truths to which all Christians owe deference
and allegiance. Those who deny the existence and
force of such truths have wandered beyond protestantism into apostasy.
Yet it is precisely that apostasy to which modern
Christian intellectuals are perpetually prone. Fundamentalist Christians have been so extravagant in
their denunciations of "secular humanism" that those
of us with any pretensions whatever to intellectual
sophistication are tempted to deny its very existence.
Yet it most assuredly does exist; indeed, its doctrines
dominate our intellectual life. The highest quality of
mind to which the modern intellectual typically aspires
is a kind of humane skepticism. Although humanist
academics continue-more out of habit than conviction-to employ the rhetoric of being engaged in a
search for truth, they most of the time operate as
thorough-going relativists for whom truth, to the extent one can speak of it at all, is always plural, fluid,
and entirely contextual. For humanists, it seems, the
guiding intuition of the educational enterprise is that
beyond the empirical realm nothing is finally and
knowably true for certain.
For Christians, that cannot suffice. We may acknowledge that the inquiring and skeptical mind is the beginning of wisdom, but we cannot rest with agnosticism as wisdom's end. It is not for nothing that we
pray, "Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief." We
ask questions, in other words, expecting to find answers; we believe that u ltimate and absolute values do
exist. The options of the intellectual world, we assume,
are not exhausted by the polar categories of credulity
and skepticism. As Richard J ohn Neuhaus has put it,
our intellectual journey of faith travels "from the authoritarian, through the autonomous, to the acknowledgement of the authoritative."
One must frame one's argument very carefully here.
Christians believe that the world ultimately makes decipherable sense. That does not mean that they look
to their faith for some sort of all-comprehending key
to life's mysteries, contradictions, and ambiguities. The
mysteries of the faith remain at some level precisely
that; Christianity does not provide convenient answers
to all or even most of life's intellectual, moral, or aesthetic questions. Christians are, by definition, believers,
but our faith paradoxically frees us from the compulsions of the true believer. It is, ironically, faith's gift of
ultimate grace and assurance that allows us to live with
massive existential uncertainty in all those proximate
areas of knowledge and behavior that constitute our
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day-to-day lives.
But Christian intellectuals remain aliens in the modern intellectual world. When social scientists speak of
modernization, they refer to the process of movement
from traditional to contemporary forms of society, and
they customarily include in that process evolution
from religious to rational modes of value formation.
In that perspective, religion becomes a pre-modern
phenomenon, and modern man-autonomous, rationalistic, scientific-is by definition non-religious.
It is difficult, then, to exaggerate the degree of isolation of Christian belief from the reigning intellectual
mind-set. The problem is not so much that the answers of faith are rejected; it is rather that faith's questions are not entertained in the first place. Orthodox
Christians in the modern world dwell in an intellectual
backwater.
Most of us find it uncomfortable to contemplate the
degree of our isolation from modern intellectual assumptions. That isolation, when fully confronted,
creates tendencies to one of two despairing forms of
response. The first is a kind of willed obscurantism:
too intense a reaction against secular rationalism and
skepticism can produce a definition of faith that measures its depth by its capacity to accept rational or scientific absurdities. The current strength of neo-fundamentalism testifies to the power of that temptation.
The other tendency-perhaps more common for the
intellectual-is to a gradual accommodationism, an incremental sacrifice of particularity to the point where
Christianity loses its capacity to offend or embarrass by
minimizing its distinction from secular preoccupations.
Mainstream American Christianity provides a continuing case study in that temptation.
Probably most Christian intellectuals see themselves
as occupying a middle ground between the dogmatists
and the relativists, remaining open to the claims of
faith but preserving an acute consciousness of the dangers of specifying truth prematurely or too precisely.
Yet it may be that in practice the exercise is less one
of maintaining a careful balance than of carrying on
a schizophrenic mental existence. One suspects that
most Christian academics avoid the discomfort of the
problematic relationship between the relativism that
dominates their professional thinking and the claims
to ultimate truth their faith imposes on them by leading carefully compartmentalized intellectual lives. The
arena of faith-prayer, piety, and confessional commitment-remains walled off from the rest of their intellectual activity.
That reaction is entirely understandable. Christian
faith without some notion of heresy makes no senseno heresy, no orthodoxy-but the notion of heresy is
destructive of free intellectual exchange. Since abso-

6

lute truth claims appear inescapable in the one realm
and pernicious in their effects in the other, the available solution is to keep the two realms strangers to
each other. Otherwise one encounters apparently insuperable problems: a relativistic faith may be imaginable in the abstract but is surely an enemy of the
existential commitment that the life of faith requires,
while secular intellectual exchanges conducted in
terms of heresy and orthodoxy deny the humility that
civility (and the available evidence) would seem to call
for.
Yet such an arrangement, however convenient, does
not appear indefinitely sustainable. The two-centurylong decline of faith among western intellectuals
suggests the difficulty of affirming religious truth
claims in an intellectual atmosphere that finds such affirmations incoherent. On the other side of the dilemma, we have been witnessing for some time now an
increasing discontent with the positivist world view.
From all over the intellectual landscape come indications of what Neuhaus has termed "a movement away
from all varieties of solipsism and toward the acknowledgement of truth . that is external to ourselves." Our
lived experience, moral and intellectual, suggests the
reality of an objective order of right and truth that
exists independently of our perception of it.
It is not necessary that acknowledgement of truth
lead to rigid dogmatism or obsessive heresy-hunting.
There is a difference, after all, between assuming that
truth exists and that our perception of it can be either
complete or unclouded. One can believe, as it seems
Christians must, that the world ultimately makes sense
and still retain humility as to the precision with which
one can make out that sense. Once we have confessed
unreservedly that Jesus is Lord, we can live with a
good deal of uncertainty elsewhere without succumbing to a view of the world as a random proposition.
There are, in fact, paths in modern philosophy that
leave open the possiblity of convergence between commitment to truth and openness as to its realization.
Charles S. Peirce, for example, the great American
pragmatist, spoke of reality as a "would-be"-that
which would be agreed upon if all the evidence were
known and all viewpoints on it critically evaluated.
Such paths bear further exploration.
For Christian intellectuals, the potential closing of
the gap between our realms of perception opens profound possibilities. It can make for a more closely integrated, if never entirely unified, style of life. It can
give a new urgency to our scholarly probings. What
could be more exciting, after all, than the possibility
that in our intellectual searching we are opening the
opportunity of a glimpse-even if but through a glass,
darkly-at the very face of God?
Cl
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Gail McGrew Eifrig

BAlANCING WORDSWORTH
AND WODEHOUSE
An Intelligent W oman's Guide to
Life, the Universe, and Everything

(Editor's Note: Last February, the Valparaiso University
chapter of Mortar Board, the national student honor society,
sponsored a Last Lecture series. Participants were asked to
prepare a lecture as if it were to be the last they would ever
present. This is the second essay in that series to be published
by The Cresset. Frederick A. Niedner, Jr.'s " '0 Give
Thanks . . .': A Meditation on Life as Gift and Thanksgiving" appeared in April.)

I am surprised and pleased to see anybody here tonight; during the last week, most people I know came
up to me to say that they wouldn't be at the lecture,
but they thought the title was great: what was I going
to say? The title is formidable, because I needed something to provide a counterweight to the immensely
foreboding task of coming up with something that
could be called a "Last Lecture." The series title is
enough to give me at least the collywobbles, and when
the four of us lecturers talked it over, we decided that
there were a number of things that could be done with
such an eschatological assignment. Somebody who's
good at multiple meanings of words (and anything
else) could tell you all about that, but this isn't his lecture, so you'll have to do your own rundown on all the
possibilities, and perhaps then you'll be able to tell
where my lecture best fits into the typology of last lectures.
I think that my response to the task of imagining
what my last lecture would be like was characteristic of
me; I started thinking about what book I could talk
about. Because-and I might as well confess it here as

Gail McGrew Eifrig teaches English at Valparaiso University and contributes regularly to The Cresset.
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anywhere-! am what my family calls a "readaholic."
There it is; I've said it, and it's the plain truth, there's
no getting away from it. I read all the time, ever since
the moment (which I can still remember very clearly)
that I first realized that those marks on the paper
were the same thing as the word "stop." It was in the
cartoon "Henry," for which not many words are provided, and since that "STOP" I've never looked back;
in fact, I've never been able to "stop."
I read everything. I blush to say that I have, when
trapped in the car, read the owner's manual to a 1978
Pontiac we didn't even own. I've read the cards in my
wallet, and the backs of the aspirin bottles in my
purse-anything. Now that I've gotten older and craftier, I hide things to read in places I'm liable to be. I
now have books stashed under the front seat of the
car, for instance; no more owner's manuals for me.
My coat pockets are always torn at the corners because
I usually try to put books into them. (Well, you never
know, the recitalist might not show up on time, the
train will probably be late, the person I'm meeting for
breakfast will turn ou t to have gone to India or something-who knows when I may need that quick read?)
I'm so far gone that I kind of mainline books now,
anything I can get, and all at once if possible. What
am I reading now? Melville's Typee, a book of reminiscenses about English rural life in the 1890s called Lark
Rise to Candleford, Wodehouse's The Code of the Woosters,
Dorothy Sayers' The Mind of the Maker, and a fascinating two-part article in the New Yorker about off-shore
oil drilling in the North Sea. So, you see, I am the sort
of person for whom life is very largely imagined in
print. I am not, I think, unresponsive to visual or
aural images (my husband would tell it differently, bu t
this is not his lecture), but mainly I respond to written
words.
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One of the implications of this peculiarity of mine
is that it makes me very different from most students,
or younger people. Like C. S. Lewis describing himself
to an audience as a dinosaur because he was a last living example of the classically-educated scholar, I feel
that I too am living beyond my time, living when most
people with whom I talk and act experience the world
much more directly than I do, but perhaps also much
more restrictedly. When I am asked, as this lecture assignment asks, "Tell us what really matters to you," I
think immediately of how to describe to you some
pieces of writing which are, for me, profoundly important pieces of my world. To me they are real, by which
I do not mean to say that I believe in the fictions
which many of the things I love to read set up, but
rather that the experiences that I have when reading
are real experiences.
They are real in the sense that I could narrate them
to you, describe their contours, tell you what it is like
to feel moved and changed and uplifted through the
medium of print. By reading I can experience pleasure, or sorrow, or anxiety, or pride, or embarrassment
so strongly that it is very similar to an actual experience. For instance, when Emma is rude to Miss
Bates and is chided by Mr. Knightly, I feel my own
cheeks redden. I would find it very difficult to teach
Jude the Obscure, for instance, because of the overwhelming depression and despair that I experience in
reading it.
I think I'm safe: I do know the difference between
these experiences and "real" experiences, but it is
nonetheless true that, sitting in a chair, quite still, I am
acting and being and doing, because of what is happening between the page, my eyes, my brain. Thus,
reading is to me a sort of principal activity, like eating
or sleeping, and I suppose my amazement at the extent to which other people don't read, or read only
what they have to, or read as fast as they can to get
it over with, is like the bemusement of someone who
finds that skiing, or jogging, or travelling abroad, or
watching movies, or solving mathematical puzzles is so
wonderful and so necessary to her own well-being that
she can't imagine why everybody doesn't do it.
So I want to talk tonight about two pieces of writing
that are important to me because they provide me
with pleasure. At times, I have experienced from both
of them something very like joy, an intensity of pleasure in a feeling of goodness. They are very differentWordsworth's "Ode on Intimations of Immortality"
and the novels of P. G. Wodehouse-but they both
have a necessary place in my way of understanding
life. They serve as correctives to two frequently-encountered (and opposite) misapprehensions about the
nature of human beings and what is happening to
8

them as they go about their lives: the misapprehensions of believing that we are either less than, or more
than, we are.
I don't pretend to be talking to youth from the pinnacle of the wisdom of age, because one of the things
that a little bit of age and wisdom tells you is that it's
no good expecting the young to listen to what you
have to tell them. But you asked for this talk, and you
came, so of my small stock of wisdom, one bit: life is
full of unhappiness, and part of the business of learning is to learn what to do with it. I hope that doesn't
sound just too grim; it isn't meant to be discouraging
or threatening. In a way, it's even meant to cheer you
up; if you are sometimes unhappy, something is not
necessarily wrong with you. Trouble is not pathological, it is endemic.
Our culture seems to have a big stake in getting us
to think that unhappiness is something we better do
something about-blow it away, forget about it, drink
ourselves out of it, spend ourselves out of it-~ome
thing, anything to get it to go away. But that's our
world speaking, and, if I may use a term in a theological way, the flesh speaking. (I promise not to be too
theological, because somebody in theology should
cover that territory, but this isn't his lecture.) Until we
longing humans are finally at one with our source, our
home, our Father, our God, something in us will be
unhappy, and the world around us reflects that unhappiness of separation in gigantic scale.
So the question is not, how do you keep from being
unhappy, but rather, what do you do with unhappiness? And my answer is that you need to find something that helps you go through it to the other side,
something that has the capacity to restore your perspective, something that has power to "'breed perpetual benediction."
You thought I'd never get there, but I have. That
was Wordsworth, in Section X of the great "Intimations Ode." If you are young and have never read it,
or if you read it once in school and hated it, don't feel
guilty. It's even perfectly OK if you get it out, read it,
and still don't like it. Not everybody needs the same
remedy, and I'm only telling you about mine, not insisting that it has to be yours. Only, you might give
this poem a try every five years or so, just to see
whether you and the poem are now on the same wave
length. I hated Wordsworth, and indeed most poetry,
until I was very old, so you see, you can't tell at this
point.
One of the reasons that Wordsworth's poem is important to me is that it is about unhappiness, butmore than that-it is about the experience of unhappiness. Part of the situation is that the poet, or speaker,
has hit a period in which human life seems to be diThe Cresset

minished , seems to be less than it ought to be. (As a
sort of side note, I want to say that the speaker in the
poem has always seemed to me somewhat non-gender
related, a speaker who could be either male or female,
which is a point for somebody who's an expert on
feminist criticism to discuss, but this isn't her lecture.)
The poem begins at a point when the poet feels that
human life means very little; and when we reach the
point where this view of life dominates our perspective, something needs to change it, to give us an image
of an enlarged, ennobled, more exalted possibility for
life.
That is what happens in the "Intimations Ode." The
poem narrates the speaker's undergoing of sorrow,
and allows us to participate in the experience as a
whole. Thus, it is a poem in which the "coming
through to the other side" matters, it is what the poem
is doing. The technical word for this is a "crisis lyric,"
a term I learned from the notes of the great critic
Harold Bloom. I hope I will not be thought ungrateful
for the untiring efforts of Professor Bloom, however,
when I say I think he is all wet about the poem as a
whole. Because he maintains that, although the poem
means to get to the other side of the experience of
sorrow, it never really does, since Wordsworth is so
caught up in the pleasure of describing the pain of
loss that he cannot convince us of the reality of his
gain.
It is certainly true that the poem is about loss, or really the sense of loss. One of the most immediately
striking things about it is the strong concentration on
time. It begins like this:
There was a time when meadow, grove, and stream
The earth, and every common sight,
To me did seem
Appareled in celestial light,
The glory and the freshness of a dream.
It is not now as it hath been of yore;
Turn wheresoe'er I may,
By night or day,
The things which I have seen I now can see no more.
The rainbow comes and goes,
And lovely is the rose,
The moon doth with delight
Look round her when the heavens are bare ;
Waters on a starry night
Are beautiful and fair;
The sunshine is a glorious birth ;
But yet I know, where'er I go
That there hath passed away a glory from the earth.

Just looking at the verbs in the first two sections
creates a powerful tension between past and present:
was, did seem, it is not, hath been, turn, I have seen
I now can see, comes, goes, is, doth, look, are, is,
know, go, hath past away. These verbs carry an imSeptember, 1986

mense amount of weight, and concentrate the poem
vigorously from the outset on this one theme: the
world is now different from what it used to be when
I was happy in it. But the third section begins with an
insistent "Now," so that we are pulled forceably away
from that vanished glory into a present of song and
joy and childhood and spring. The voice of the poet
at this point, however, only lets us know those things
exist. What is more important to him is his own grief,
his sense of being alone amid the pleasures of the
earth, and then, the news of the "timely utterance,"
the poem itself, which, he asserts, "gave that thought
relief' and left him once again "strong."

Wordsworth doesn't use the biblical
version of the myth of creation and
fall; indeed, he uses an entirely
new picture, with language so
expressive that it has entered the
speech patterns of our culture and
become almost a cliche.
He does insist, in this section, that through his own
efforts he will once again experience joy, participate in
human goodness and pleasure, the "festival" which at
first he says he feels, then later insists that he does indeed hear. Line 51, however, opens with that ominous
"-But there's a tree," one detail of the natural world,
soon followed by other details, and all of them repeating the initial question, the central question of the
poem, "Whither is fled the visionary gleam? Where is
it now, the glory and the dream?" One's own efforts,
however strenuous, are never enough of themselves to
recover on demand the necessary and sustaining sense
of our vital relationship to a glorious world.
The next four sections pull back from the intense
personal tone to become more general, "I" becomes
"Our" for awhile, as the poet puts his own sense of
loss into the context of the whole human creation and
its fall. Wordsworth doesn't use the biblical version of
the myth; indeed, he uses an entirely new picture,
with language so expressive that it has entered the
speech patterns of our culture and become almost a
cliche:
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar;
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home . . .
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Each individual then recapitulates the fall into sin,
as doctrine puts it, or in Wordsworth's terms "shades
of the prison house begin to close Upon the growing
boy." Through the next section the poet muses on the
history of the individual, so eager to rush into age,
and thus to take on "the inevitable yoke ," each person
pursuing the course which means that inevitable loss
of the sense of light, the "vision splendid" which at
first accompanied him in his life. And it is true that
by the end of Section VIII, when the poet describes
life, he does so in an image that leaves us in no doubt
of his feelings.
Full soon thy soul shall have her earthly freight,
And custom lie upon thee with a weight,
Heavy as frost, and deep almost as life!

The soul is heavy with the weight of life itself, though
the language turns a neat trick here, as "custom" or
"habit" is said to weigh upon the soul with the coldness of frost, and the depth, we might have said, of
the sea, or of a pit, or some such image, but
Wordsworth uses life itself as the vehicle of the
image-habit is as cold, as heavy, as deep almost as life
itself ... is deep, is cold, is heavy.
Now, had the poem ended there, we'd have had, I
think, what Professor Bloom says we have, a brilliantly
evocative description of what it is to feel the unhappiness of separation from our true sources of joy. But
the poem does not end, it goes on to Section IX, and
begins "0 joy!" The last words of the previous section
are not all that is to be said, because there is something in us which prevents that cold, deep heaviness
from being the last word about our life. We are
greater than we dare, in our worst moments, to think.
In us, Wordsworth says, is something which counteracts the despair, and he connects it with "the
thought of our past years" which "breeds perpetual
benediction." But what does he mean by the "thought
of our past years"? Does he just mean the recollections
of childhood, and the fact that we can recall at will
those moments when we felt blessed, and that recalling
those good times will help us get through the bad?
The next lines reject that too-simple solution. No, it
is not for that capacity which he gives thanks, but for
something that is stranger, much harder to describe,
that which the poem nearly falls apart trying to describe: "For those obstinate questionings of sense and
outward things, failings from us, vanishings ... blank
misgivings, high instincts . . . first affections, those
shadowy recollections . . ."
What are these things he's talking about? As usual,
the difficulty of the idea gets to be almost too much
for Wordsworth's ability to put words around it. What
is the capacity that saves us from the despair of realiz-
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ing our deep loss? Wait, he says, after struggling
through a great deal of difficult language, I'll show
you. And then comes what is to me one of the most
perfect, powerful, simple, absolutely beautiful images
in all of literature:
Hence in a season of calm weather
Though inland far we be,
Our souls have sight of that immortal sea
Which brought us hither,
Can in a moment travel thither,
And see the children sport upon the shore,
And hear the mighty waters rolling evermore.

There it is, there is what we can be thankful for.
That we are creatures whose minds contain images
which we cannot account for by mere rationality. That
however far we feel ourselves to be from our sources
of joy, however we may have become unable to recognize our own greatness, there can come, all of a sudden, a moment when we are transported straight to
the heart of that source of our joy and our greatness,
a moment when we know through all our senses the
real, solid truth of that place where we belong.

To my eye, the rest of the poem is a
coming down gently from the almost
too-intense power of this image. It
is very much a space in which to
reflect on what one has come through.
It is not our imagination or merely our longing that
makes us conscious that we don't belong in the world
as it crowds around us every day. In the image Wordsworth uses his strongest and most characteristic means
of expressing knowledge; he says our souls see their
source, and for him the soul's sight is the most emphatic validator of truth. Our conviction about, our knowledge of that place where we truly belong is as certain
and as plainly true as the stubby, wet legs of the children as they splash on the edges of that mighty sea.
To my eye, the rest of the poem is a coming down
gently from the almost too-intense power of this
image. It is very much a space in which to reflect on
the experience one has just come through. And I
think it is that, as much as the content of what is said,
that makes this poem so thoroughly satisfying to me,
and keeps it one of the things I count on. It stands as
a record of the facing of unhappiness, sorrow, and
loss. There are "thoughts that do often lie too deep
for tears," and while Wordsworth's conclusion stresses
more strongly than I would that it is human love,
human joy, human tenderness that gives the most and
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best comfort, I find his ode perpetually breeding benedictions in me for its turning of my attention to
what is truest.
But, true as Wordsworth is, there are large areas of
life when he is not what's wanted. At least, it's not
what I want. This is the other side of the two opposing
misapprehensions about life that I mentioned earlier.
For if we are sometimes unhappy because we fail to
perceive the divinity in our nature, we are also made
miserable by our overlooking, sometimes for long
periods of time, that we are also four-star examples of
the silly ass. Should I ever become too weighted down
with the sense of my eternal self and all its significances, too aware that much of the universe depends
on me, I need great walloping doses of something that
will rearrange my perspective. And because they
pretty constantly fill the bill where I am concerned,
I'm going to talk just a little bit about the novels of P.
G. Wodehouse.
But first, I am not insisting that this is just the ticket
for everybody. I would only say that if you have some
source of pleasure, some solace, some restorative
which is pretty sublime, you'd probably better have a
corresponding one which is pretty ridiculous. Evelyn
Waugh says, on the back of all my Penguin editions,
"Mr. Wodehouse's idyllic world can never stale. He
will continue to release future generations from captivity that may be more irksome than our own . He has
made a world for us to live in and delight in."
I don't know whether I am happiest contemplating
Bertie Wooster, unsuccessful in his attempt to steal the
leather-bound notebook in which Gussie Fink-Nottle
has written scathing comments on his fiancee Madeline
Bassett's father, treed atop a wardrobe in Stiffy Byng's
bedroom by her Aberdeen terrier, or thinking about
Lord Emsworth giving advice to his pigman George
Cyril Wellbeloved on the care and feeding of his prize
pig, the Empress of Blandings, but it doesn't really
matter, I don't have to choose.
Almost anytime, I can pop down to Blandings Castle
and observe the goings-on with perfect ease, certainly
more easily than did the Reverend Cuthbert (Bill)
Bailey when brought down by Lord Ickenham (Uncle
Fred) when he attempted to palm him off as a Mr.
Merriweather from Brazil, primarily so that Bill and
his beloved Myra Schoonmaker, who was being looked
after by Lady Constance, could continue their verymuch forbidden romance, which would have worked
out all right if he hadn't agreed to help steal the Empress as a way of placating Uncle Alaric, the Duke of
Dunstable, well-known in the county as the egg-throwing peer without peer. But I digress.
It is tempting but futile to try to describe
Wodehouse's attraction, because what I think is hilariSeptember, I986

ous may only make you wonder what cog I have slipped. But since this is my lecture, after all, I will describe one or two details for my own pleasure. Often
we are led through the circuitous path of a
Wodehouse plot by the quintessential silly ass, Bertram
Wooster, as a first person narrator. Thus we are allowed the perennial pleasure of hearing him take himself seriously, which is what he might describe as a
"rum sight, don't you know." His view of himself as
impressive and cool is perfectly displayed in this excerpt from Code of the Woosters.
In the narrative of my earlier adventures with Augustus
Fink-Nottle at Brinkley Court, with which you may or may
not be familiar, I mentioned that I had once read a historical
novel about a Buck or Beau or some such cove who, when
it became necessary for him to put people where they belonged,
was in the habit of laughing down from lazy eyelids and
flicking a speck of dust from the irreproachable Mechlin lace
at his wrists. And I think I stated that I had had excellent
results from modelling myself on this bird.
I did so now.
"Stiffy," I said, laughing down from lazy eyelids and flicking a speck of cigarette ash from my irreproachable cuff, "I
will trouble you to disgorge that book."
I could see that all this was perplexing her. She had sup-
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posed that she had Bertram nicely ground beneath the iron
heel, and here he was, popping up like a two-year-old, full
of the fighting spirit.
"What do you mean?"
I laughed down a bit more.
"I should have supposed," I said, flicking, "that my meaning was quite clear. I want that notebook of Gussie's, and I
want it immediately, without any more back chat."
"Ha jolly ha!"
"Ha jolly ha! to you, young Stiffy, with knobs on," I retorted with quiet dignity.
Several of the purely verbal things that are comic
about the passage are the names themselves (Augustus
Fink-Nottle, Stiffy), the juxtaposition of the very formal (irreproachable Michlin lace) with the slangy (this
bird), the repetition of a word or phrase without -its accompaniments, so that it becomes ridiculous (flicking),
and the frequency of the cliche (ground beneath the
iron heel, full of the fighting spirit). But beyond this ,
we are amused at the idea of Bertie comparing himself
to the hero of the historical novel, or of his perceiving
himself to be behaving with quiet dignity when he says
something like "Ha jolly hal to you, young Stiffy, with
knobs on."
This kind of analysis really can't go on, because the
butterfly lightness of the Wodehouse touch is a perfection that scrutiny can only deaden. But the analysis
can be done, and the artistry is no less great for having taken a fragile form.
As I have said, there are times when the intelligent
woman has to be aware. that Wordsworth will not always avail. I know for a fact that Wodehouse once
saved our marriage. It was in a campground in Kircudbright, Scotland, on our anniversary. Something or
other had got us furious with each other, and there we
were in this tiny little camper, having sent the children
outside to play in the rain, while we continued an argument that finally couldn't go on. A million miles
from anywhere, one vehicle, three-and a-half children
on our hands, neither of us could walk out and slam
the door-not very convincingly.
Fortunately, Uncle Fred in the Springtime was at hand,
and we read that out loud to each other until we could
speak again in civil tones. It didn't take long, because
soon we were both laughing at the terrible mess that
happened when Pongo Twistleton and his uncle went
to the dog races, and there ran afoul of Private Investigator Claude "Mustard" Pott, whose daughter Polly .. .
oh, never mind. We had, you see, got ourselves into
a place where we could not see for ourselves that we
were foolish, and that in a great many human activities, it is only a "Hey, nonny, nonny" that will save
us from the damnation of our own seriousness. And
for that kind of reminder, give me Bertie Wooster

every time.
Well, I am not going to talk about the other two
literary allusions in my title. George Bernard Shaw really did write a book called The Intelligent Woman's
Guide to Socialism and Capitalism and I have always liked
the title, so it seemed appropriate for such a grand
undertaking as a "last lecture." The very idea of talking in one hour or less about what is most important
to you called to my mind Douglas Adams' book, The
H itchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy. In this book, for those
of you who are not already fans, there is a computer
designed to give us humans the answer to the question
"What is the meaning of Life, the Universe, and Everything?" It has spoken, I believe, and I don't think
you should have to wait a moment longer. The answer
is 42.
Cl

Bombers
In the state of Washington,
On the side of helmets,
There are mushroom clouds,
Fifty of them each Friday night
Through November, and I am
Driving to interview the coach
Who designed this logo, forcing
A generation to strap it on.
"It looks silly from the stands,"

A father says, "Like a toadstool,
Especially under the lights
And loss." One player confesses
He has dreamed of being a dot:
During a tackle, a plane passed
And he looked up into
The open belly where light shone.
Look, I could argue and listen
To none of these people, but twenty
Of these players' fathers , across town,
Are making bombs for a living,
And on the snap count they move together
And from a distance, or above,
Someone looking through a sight
Sees a two-toned team leveled
By a stiff, invisible shame.

Gary Fincke

James D. Black

A REACTIONARY PROPOSAL
The Case for Teaching Facts

Educational theorists are seized by peculiar
philosophical enthusiasms almost as frequently as teenagers adopt new tribal garb. It is currently fashionable (again) to espouse both critical thinking and
creativity as desirable goals of education, and (for
once) both are worthy indeed of advocacy. I consider
myself reasonably enlightened-! dislike uncritical
thinking and noncreativity, as I dislike oil spills and air
pollution. However, I am also in favor of the reactionary practice of teaching facts .
It's a practice in widespread disfavor. From national
conventions to the teachers' lounge down the hall
come cries of "Don't teach facts! " or "All students can
do nowadays is regurgitate facts! " There is a suspiciously smug and self-righteous tone to these outcries,
as if their speakers had somehow found the secret to
teaching their students to be superbly creative or to
analyze and generalize with perfect logic~r as if the
teachers themselves were possessors of intellects too
lofty to be troubled by facts. Frankly, I'd be delighted
to find a noticeable number of students capable of
regurgitating facts. (Likewise, I'd be very pleased to
find that some teachers of my acquaintance had
learned some facts since we last talked.)
Certainly the teaching of facts can be a dismal practice capable of great abuse. Mr Gradgrind shows us
one type of misuse, and T . S. Eliot was speaking of
still another danger when he wrote, "Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?/ Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?" Few of us are like
Macauley's legendary schoolboys, apparently ready to
regurgitate factual effluvia at the drop of a question,
and it's barely possible that the teaching of history has
improved from the time that it consisted of memorizing innumerable dates, battles, kings, and queens-and
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little else. Nevertheless, if we stop teaching factual history, we lose something, and if we denigrate the teaching of facts in general, we will have lost a great deal.
There seems to be some human bent toward knowing facts. Toddlers ask "What is . . . ?" as much as or
more than they ask "Why?" Observe a group of preschoolers for even a brief few moments, and they will
be heard garrulously exchanging information on some
topic of interest to them-the characteristics of some
Saturday morning cartoon hero, if nothing else.
Elementary school children, unless they are mentally
deficient, adore learning facts. Quite independent of
adult encouragement or any classroom instruction,
they prove themselves capable of learning truly amazing quantities of specialized facts: one knows dinosaurs; another, autos; a third, computers; a fourth,
rock stars; and so on. Throughout my own growingup, I recall hearing (and saying) "Did you know that
. . . ?" countless times, and I enjoyed being stumped
and stumping others with whatever piece of trivia was
then current.
I've now reached my middle years, and am observing a considerable portion of our nation become manic
about Trivial Pursuit or its clones, willing to learn vast
numbers of obscure and perhaps worthless facts about
the number of dimples on a golf ball or about the current events of another generation's childhood. Furthermore, today's publishers find a ready market for
trivia books, which bespeaks the presence of a sizable
audience willing to purchase them.
And why not? There is an obvious satisfaction in
knowing something, even if that something is only information, not knowledge or wisdom. Right answers,
even to trivial questions, are inherently satisfying.
Are such facts really worthless? Perhaps many of
them are. Certainly so long as they remain mere information, they may have little value beyond our ability
to win games or work crossword puzzles with them.
However, the knowing is fun, and the satisfaction of
knowing is highly important. Rather than defame facts
and factual knowledge, we should find some way to
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sustain the childhood pleasure at acquiring facts into
teenage and adult learning, and to teach even more
facts.
We repeat our simplistic axiom: knowing facts can
be fun. It's true, and it's one of the reasons that so
many of us have chosen an academic career-it allows
us to learn more about a chosen subject, and much of
that learning is factual, even if it consists of what we
insist is a higher order of facts.
Our second axiom: facts have worth. Knowing facts
gives us mental equilibrium. Knowledge of even the
simplest facts gives us some sense of control over a
world which otherwise would seem very mysterious,
even alien and threatening. We feel a sense of comfort
and mastery if we have a supply of familiar data about
our world. If we can arrange this data into some
meaningful pattern, so much the better-surely we
feel a stronger sense of psychological safety if we can
comprehend and categorize our observation. It's the
comfort Alice felt in her accustomed world when she
returned from Wonderland.
Knowing facts is the quickest way to combat ignorance. We can expend enormous time and energy trying to reason with a child or an ignorant adult, and
perhaps it is admirable to want him to comprehend
theory, but in terms of pure efficiency, it is frequently
better to present facts. The hoary hot-stove example
comes to mind. Explain the physics of heat later-first
teach the child not to touch the stove. Similarly, teach
the child how to solve simple math problems, the facts
about democracy, or other content-facts. Time enough
for deepening his insights later.
Please don't misunderstand. Do notice that I am not
advocating an "either/or" dichotomy, either facts or
theory. I am four-square behind the learning of
theoretical bases of factual knowledge, but in so many
cases such learning is inefficient and impractical as a
starting point.
I would argue that the misadventure of public
schools with the "New Math" a generation ago illustrates gross ignorance of this principle. The teaching
of New Math attempted to instill a premature understanding of principles, a goal that conflicted with insufficient mastery of basic mathematical operations.
Again turning to my own experiences in math, I recall
learning in fairly rote fashion how to do mathematical
operations in a somewhat mechanical way. In other
words, I learned facts, "Do this, then this." I wasn't
worried about why, nor about base 10 or set theory. I
did math problems and enjoyed getting right answers.
Moreover, I could do practical, real-world math: I
could help my father calculate bushels of corn per
acre or how many cubic yards of concrete we needed
to pour our basement floor, problems whose solutions
14

are beyond the capacity of the average teenager today.
1 recall vividly when flashes of mathematical insight
did strike me, insights which enabled me to see the
theory behind the practical and rote applications.
Those moments of illumination were great fun, also,
and I have equally vivid memories of working dozens
of problems simply to enjoy seeing the general principles at work. But I suspect that if I had attempted to
understand the theory first, I would have been lost
forever.

I suspect that loading youngsters with
transformational grammar will cause
confusion equal to that cause~ by the
New Math. Better to teach the average
student to write simple sentences.
No doubt an overdose of sentence diagramming
would have similar effects, even though I now enjoy
the practice myself and sometimes mentally diagram
the very sentences I am speaking during a lecture.
Likewise, I suspect that loading youngsters with transformational grammar will cause confusion equal to
that caused by the New Math. Better to teach the average student to write clear simple sentences. Perhaps
then we can teach him to vary his writing by telling
him something about elementary sentence combining,
or to vary his style by putting introductory word
groups in some sentences and not in others.
In just this way Jerome Bruner was correct twenty
years ago when he advocated a cyclical and repetitive
approach to the teaching of a subject. Expose the child
to the same ideas at intervals, trying to deepen and extend his understanding with each exposure. Begin
with the concrete and move toward the abstract.
Begin, in other words, with information-facts-and
afterwards move toward knowledge and (for the more
capable) a deeper, more conceptual level of understanding.
Factual knowledge has additional worth. Knowing
certain facts gives us a cache of what E. D. Hirsch, Jr.
calls "cultural literacy. " Without minimal supply of
those facts which our culture assumes all of us know,
we are isolated from our contemporaries who do know
them. Furthermore, cultural illiteracy cuts us off from
the past, from trivial but enjoyable shared knowledge
as well as from "the best that has been thought and
said."
Two recent incidents should suffice to illustrate
some unexpected extremes of cultural illiteracy. First,
a colleague of mine who teaches French recently attempted to give her first-year students a change of
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pace in written vocabulary drills by providing them
with the names of famous American holidays; they
were to respond by writing in French the names of the
months in which these holidays fall. Many were unsuccessful, for they didn't know that Halloween occurs in
October, or that Valentine's Day falls in February.
Some did not even know that Christmas comes in December or that New Year's Day is in January.
The second incident was related to me by my wife,
a math teacher. She tried to enliven a quiz of her students' knowledge of certain algebraic terms by having
them solve clues and use the resulting terms to complete a cross-word puzzle. Surprisingly, many students
who solved the clues couldn't do the cross-word portion because they didn't know how such puzzles
worked. When they solved clue number one, for
example, they attempted to put the entire answer in
the single square marked "1."
Such examples may not be convincing to those who
minimize the importance of cultural literacy. The consequences of such ignorance are regrettable, perhaps
occasionally serious, but seldom lethal-and gory illustrations are always more persuasive. Sequestered
academics seldom suspect the presence of this degree
of cultural illiteracy, but once they hear of it, all
should be able to imagine the consequences if it is
multiplied manyfold. Ask any teacher who has
searched in vain for commonality of knowledge with
his students, who has tried allusion after allusion only
to discover that no one has the slightest idea what he
is talking about even when he quotes "Oh, Susanna."
Even a skeptic will rapidly conclude that without some
knowledge beyond the 1,200 words in Basic English, a
person is seriously handicapped indeed. What can he
read? To whom can he communicate in anything
other than monosyllabic grunts or the ubiquitous "You
know .. ."? Where is his access to and utilization of
that body of knowledge that has traditionally formed
the backbone of our cultural inheritance?
Writers of grade school and high school textbooks
appear to be quite aware of students' lack of information. The current textbook controversy in several
states (Virginia and California, for two) stems in large
part from what some call the "dumbing-down" of texts
by publishers. Simplify the vocabulary, remove the allusions, stress the contemporary and ephemeral by removing the traditional knowledge, cut down the quantity of content, and you have a textbook that even the
slowest student can read-and that none but the
slowest will want to read. Rather than upgrade the student, it's easier to downgrade the text. Such publishers
seem to feed upon ignorance rather than fight it.
Sadly, among the ignorant they cater to are substantial
numbers of so-called teachers who themselves appear
September, 1986

to know less and less with each generation.
This caving-in to ignorance strikes me as blatantly
wrong, a type of academic immorality. It reflects the
obverse of the points I am attempting to make: that
factual knowledge has worth in itself, because even if
trivial and learned piece-meal, even if subject to
change with advances in knowledge, facts provide the
essential vocabulary through which we learn about our
world and which we use when we talk about our
world. Facts promote communication and sharing with
both our contemporaries and our ancestors, who
thereby become our contemporaries.
And facts do not have to remain atomistic and trivial. Facts, as someone has said, are like bones-they
give the rest of the body something to hang on. I recall quite well my own learning style as a schoolboy. In
history, I tended to learn a crude chronology first,
then to plug other dates and events and people and
trends into that framework. Even when working with
more sophisticated questions of cause-and-effect or
trends, or with tough problems in interpretation, I
could envision a time chart in my head, locate my area
or problem within that chart, and immediately have at
least a superficial understanding of time and place, of
contemporary and contiguous events. I might not find
an immediate answer, but I would be on familiar turf,
and I'd have some specific from which to generalize
and with which to support my generalizations.
Whenever I encountered new data, I simply fitted
them into their proper places on my mental time
chart. They slipped into niches and had homes. They
were never irrelevant and unrelated data if for no
other reason than their capacity to fill out my mental
chart and relate to items immediately before, after, or
simultaneous with items already there.
Moreover, I could examine the chart in broad
sweeping chunks, not just bit by bit. I could use the
chart much as I used the periodic table of elements in
my chemistry class, to organize and analyze and see relationships, not merely to locate quick answers for
crossword puzzles.
College bull sessions soon taught me that many
other students learned and used the skeleton of history in the same fashion. Of course we fleshed out
that skeleton in differing amounts, and with varying
degrees of sophistication; but we all began in the same
manner, with that factual outline in our heads.
Subsequently, my teaching experience has taught me
that my better students today still master the historical
portion of my American or British literature survey
courses in exactly this same fashion. In fact, some few
bring with them a certain amount of factual baggage
picked up in a world history course. This knowledge
is pretty spotty, it appears, probably because the
15

course isn't taught in a very systematic fashion.
Nevertheless, when I mention "Crusades," the better
students will know that they took place sometime after
the birth of Christ and before the nativity of Michael
Jackson.
In similar fashion I recall my own learning of geography, of chemistry, of practically every course I ever
took. Perhaps I use the word "fact" too loosely, but it
seems to me that our academic offerings at least
through much of undergraduate school (and perhaps
further) are largely "factual," or if not factual, at least
based upon a foundation far more factual than the
professors would like to admit. The key seems to be
"vocabulary."
I found that the the easy way to a high grade and
considerable understanding in virtually all classes was
to master a vocabulary list-sometimes a short and
easy list, sometimes a lengthy and quite complex one.
I'd begin each new course with the assumption that
my task was to master its vocabulary list. A vocabulary
item might be very simple and concrete, or it might
signify a powerful and complex theory or subtle set of
relationships. It might include sophisticated notions
such as "irony," so very difficult for most students to
apply to a piece of literature. Nevertheless, I could
study and learn "irony" in much the same fashion as
I had studied and learned "peninsula" in grade-school
geography; and its application, the search for "irony"
in a piece of literature, seemed much the same to me
as the search of a map for something which fit the
known characteristics of a "peninsula," albeit the
former application is admittedly more abstract and
more difficult.
In other words, the learning style appears to me to
be quite analogous, even though "irony" is a more
complex term. The difference (and I do suspect that
there is one) is in the level of abstraction: some "facts"
are more concrete than others. Until a student has
learned facts, however, he has only a slight chance of
advancing to knowledge at a more conceptual level.
Surely I want my students to think critically and
creatively, but I want them to have a factual basis behind their critical thinking, and I believe that creativity
works upon some raw material, not in a factual vacuum. As much as any other teacher, I decry my students' lack of thinking skills and their inability to
analyze and draw conclusions. However, even a superficial analysis of many of the most ludicrous student
answers frequently reveals an even more fundamental
problem: all too often the students don't know what
they're trying to talk about. They don't have the facts.
Without knowing basic vocabulary and without sufficient data, they struggle to criticize and analyze. In an
important sense, they cannot even read either the rna-
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terial or the questions asked about it.
Similarly with the creative process. Can one be creative if he knows nothing? I suspect that in many areas,
such as the plastic and pictorial arts, for example, the
amount of factual learning required to be creative is
very minimal. The same may be true for certain of the
word-arts: lyric poetry comes to mind as a possible
example. However, in many other areas, the degree of
creativity may frequently be linked with the creator's
prior knowledge-he makes something out of something, not out of nothing. Possessing some Godgranted gift called "creativity," can one be even more
creative if he has a well-stocked mind, full of all sorts
of strange intellectual lumber gleaned from whoknows-where? I think so. It's my observation that creative people from farmers to architects to scientists do
have minds which stockpile an incredible supply of
factual currency to be spent at odd times and in odd
fashions. No, I think it impossible to be creative in
many fields without facts.
Crossing the line between the acquisition of these
sorts of facts and the acquisition of ideas about morality is a hazardous trip, but let's stray across for a moment. Even more since I recently became a first-time
father, I wonder about how to instill a proper working
sense of morality into a child. It seems common sense
to me to argue that here, too, "facts" must be taught
before philosophy or theology.
It seems necessary to teach right and wrong, fair
and unfair, the existence of both God and evil, as a
simple and easily comprehended set of facts. Not to
teach these things seems wrong. Not to teach them
would make a child unmanageable, and uncaring
about others. Furthermore, not to teach them would
imply that they probably don't exist and aren 't important even if they do. Not to teach them would leave
my son without that certainty, that skeleton of facts
which later teaching, learning, and reflection will flesh
out into that wisdom Eliot was alluding to, a more
knowledgeable and deeper understanding of the city
of God on earth and His heavenly city.
I suppose I'm on the verge of postulating a connection between our ethical and religious attitudes on the
one hand and our attitudes toward facts on the other.
I suspect there is a connection-that one who believes
in a central cluster of unchanging values in the religious domain like as not has a similar high regard for
factual knowledge in more general and academic
areas. Likewise, a relativist in the one field is probably
a relativist in the other. The idea isn't terribly farfetched, is it? For in my case, at least, my respect for
both sets of facts originates in a core belief in the reality of an existence beyond the swirl of our own puny
selves.
Cl
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Vanna's
Puzzlement
James Combs
Oh, do not ask, "What is it?" Let
us go and make our visit. The picture flashes on a colorful spinning
wheel, the ancient symbol of the
goddess Fortuna. The studio audience chants W-H-E-E-L 0-F F-0-RT-U-N-E, and the game show is
afoot. A godlike voice over-eagerly
shows us the cornucopia of earthly
delights that await those upon
whom the goddess smiles: "A fortune in fabulous prizes .. ." The
audience on cue responds with
simulated "Ooohs" and "Ahhhs." We
are all supposed to be impressed.
There is booty to be had, me
buckos, if we dare.
We glimpse a lovely and elegantly dressed woman beckoning
us towards the treasure to be had.
No, we do not need Captain Kidd's
map, nor Aladdin's lamp, nor coordinates on The Spanish Main; we
no longer need to seek King Solomon's Mines, the Lost Dutchman
Mine, or AI Capone's loot. Treasure troves can be bestowed on ordinary mortals who need not hack
their way through distant jungles,
but rather qualify by having the
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right demographics in contestant
searches, the first hurdle in pitting
TV culture virtu against the whims
of fortuna. Captain Kidd, Aladdin,
and AI Capone wouldn't have qualified-too ethnic, too foreign, too
tough-looking.
Much care is taken in the selection of contestants. The selection
process-held in the studios of
local TV stations around the country-involves literally hundreds of
thousands of applicants, selected
not so much on how well they play
the game (there's not that much to
it) but on who they are. Game
shows sometimes want superenthusiasm (The Price is Right, Let's
Make a Deal), but they always want
pleasant personalities and a melting-pot-mix of Middle Americans.
This is clear from the quick interview the host usually does with the
contestants. The tidbits from their
lives---occupation, number of kids,
hobbies-tell us they are ordinary
folk not unlike us; more, they play
the game as well as they can, win
gratefully, and lose gracefully.
There are no sore losers, whiners,
complainers who question the justice of the game.
The lesson of the contestants is
clear enough. Life is a pleasant
game, but ultimately ruled by pluck
and luck. Winners are celebrated,
losers have their Warholian moment and disappear from consciousness. There is no nobility in
failure, only anonymity. You had
your chance, but the fickle finger
of fate didn't go your way. Wealth
and poverty are existential creations, not products of the laws of
capitalism. You have to accept the
whims of fortuna, and applaud the
accumulations of the winners. The
contest was fair-you had roughly
the same skills. The sick, deformed,
ill-educated, aged, or infirm didn't
get to play at all, but that's tough.
Yes, but. Wheel of Fortune and
most all game shows do have their
didactic aspects, but I submit that

this one in particular is not just
about the essential justice of
capitalism or commodity fetishism.
Yes, the game illustrates how the
model universe of rugged individualism should work, shows the
beneficial cupidity of competition,
and inculcates the fear of losing.
Yet it is not a Social Darwinist
world at all, fraught with fierce
cutthroat competition and class
conflict. Wheel of Fortune is a tamed
world, a ritual playlet of essential
communal harmony. Everybody is
supposed to be happy even in economic inequality. When the wheel
lands on "Bankruptcy," the contestant shrugs his or her shoulders,
the audience laments, the other
contestants offer condolence, and
the host predicts future good luck.
There is no vision of the losers becoming homeless or suicidal.

The game represents the
contemporary vision of
capitalism as altruistic,
a pleasant and harmonious
world of contestants,
not competitors.
So the game represents the contemporary vision of capitalism as
altruistic, a pleasant and harmonious world of contestants, not competitors. Wall Street becomes a
gigantic Miss America pageant, and
stockbrokers on the floor are all
Miss Congeniality. Wheel of Fortune
is a good example of the patina of
niceness that envelops the age,
sugarcoating every malevolent act
with the sticky sweetness of benevolence and good will. We may all go
broke, lose all our civil liberties,
and even be blown up, but it will
all be for our own good, done by
nice people with the best of intentions.
With the nice contestants m
place, and the nice audience re17

sponding on cue, the nice host appears. Not quite the flas hier Max
Headroom game show host with
lots of teeth and hair, Pat Sajak
quietly but confidently conducts the
proper ceremonies, beginning with
the establishment of familiarity. He
is "Pat" to the contestants; their
first names are on their nametags.
We have come to expect these astonishing displays of pseudofriendliness, perhaps in compensation for the impersonality and
downright hostility we encounter
from strangers in everyday life. Pat
is the Compleat Host, disarming,
composed, and relaxed, smoothly
conducting the show without displays of emotion or favorites, performing with the assurance of a
priest at Mass.
It sounds easy, but isn't. The TV
host of a game or talk show tries to
preside over orderly ceremonies, in
this case a pecuniary ceremony. His
(they are still all male) demeanor is
crucial to the completion of the
timely procedure, delivering, as it
were, the Host to those who worship at his shrine. Such performative skills are crucial for leaders in
the present age. Recall that the ultimate TV personality, Ronald
Reagan, was in his former life the
host of General Electric Theater and
Death Valley Days. Therein he
trained for an important role as the
Host of America, the Head
Eulogist, National Handholder,
Chief Celebrant, Ceremonialist of
Great Occasions, authoritative yet
friendly, conducting TV rituals
with the skill of the professional.
TV hosts have reason to be proud
of their most notable fellow.
Reagan is in the tradition of H ugh
Downs, Bob Barker, and Bert
Parks. (He is also in the tradition of
Paul Harvey, but that's another
story.)
With the authority of the host established, Pat introduces the "hostess," Vanna White. 0 Vanna,
Vanna. Vanna emerges from be18

hind a curtain, tall and blond and
thin and shapely, dressed in an inexhaustible wardrobe of usually
tight and revealing clothes, a goddess of health and plenty, but also
the guardian of The Secret, the
puzzle that must be solved to gain
access to the Liebfraumilch of her
prizes. She is no forbidding goddess, though; she roots for the contestants, and mourns their ill luck
by snapping her fingers in dismay
when they fail.

It sounds easy, but
isn't. The lV host of a
game or talk show tries
to preside over orderly
ceremonies, in this case
a pecuniary ceremony.
She
complements the
host
ritualist with her own functions,
which are frankly ornamental: she
stands erect and lovely, proof positive of the failure of the feminist
movement. She is a classic case of
instant celebrity, evidence (to update Shaw) that becoming a TV
game show hostess is one way to
achieve fame without talent. She is
a slightly older ("twenty-nine" is
her official age, in show business
an age for women equivalent to
Jack Benny's "thirty-nine" for men)
Barbie come to life, a dream
created by dentists, dieticians, and
health clubs. She is the Unattainable Woman of our age, with the
slight modification that many of
the males in the audience (and
there are many; she is a cult figure
among fraternity guys) fantasize
that she is attainable, at least for
those who occupy the Nether
World of celebrityland (and indeed
she is; but sadly her live-in lover, a
soap opera star, was recently killed).
Vanna now appears in Playboy, is
the subject of tabloid stories, does

commercials and interviews, is rumored to be signing a movie contract, makes "Ten Most Admired
Women" lists. Forty-two million
people watch her daily turn the letters, stretching those tight dresses
as she moves about. No airhead
she, defining her role on the show
in succinct manner: "If I didn't
turn the letters, they couldn't play
the game." I have it on the highest
authority that Vanna is actually an
eccentric itinerant philosopher, trying to delineate the limits of
functionalism, which has foundered since the days of John
Dewey and Talcott Parsons. Did
those figures ever state the case for
functionalist ontology better than
Vanna when whe told an interviewer, "Without me, how could
they solve the puzzle?" We await
any time now the publication of
her major philosophical tome, The
Logic of Functionalist Analysis.
Pat and Vanna move the show
briskly along through thoroughly
predictable paces. All over the
tube, day and night, we watch in
significant numbers. In most major
markets, Wheel of Fortune beats all
competition. It is the most popular
game show ever. In Cleveland, 46
per cent of the local audience
watches it every night, trouncing
Dan Rather. (Maybe CBS ought to
consider replacing dour Dan with
the stunning-looking newswoman
Faith Daniels of their Morning News
show.) In a billion-dollar game
show industry, Wheel of Fortune
earns for Merv Griffin Productions
estimable millions m revenue ,
mainly through syndication.
Indeed, game shows, even with
all the money and things they give
away, are relatively cheap to produce. Each WOF show costs about
$50,000; Vanna makes $100,000 or
so a year, Pat something more than
that. By comparison, each episode
of Miami Vice costs from $1,400,000
to $1,600,000 (the yearly budget,
by the way, for the actual Miami
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vice squad is about $1 ,500,000).
And Miami Vice gets a weekly audience of only thirty-three million,
compared to WOF's daily audience
of nine million more.
What makes such a tepid frivolity
so popular? Is WOF the Death Valley of the vast wasteland? Television Jeremiah Fred Friendly, still
crying in that wilderness, cites
WOF as an example of the low estate of TV today: "Television
couldn't be any worse than it is. It's
an amusement park. Everything is
beginning to look like Coney Island." On the other hand, Fred,
maybe just the reverse is happening: maybe the world is becoming
to resemble the amusement parks
of TV.
In any case, Alexander Cockburn, writing in American Film
(July/August 1986), is close to the
mark when he says that WOF is a
"stately mime of capitalism at its
best, celebrating ... the circulation
of commodities" as a "demonstration-only model of the way life
ought to be." My own thought on
its success is a little more inclusive.
Shows like WOF are indeed amusement parks, a place and event we
can enjoy without much effort.
True, WOF may be narcotizing,
mindless, pure diversion, even corrupting, but that, as Vanna might
say, has turned out-much to the
chagrin of critics-to be one of the
functions of TV.
Here let us distinguish between
creative
play
(play
involving
thought, agon, skill, engagement)
and ritual play (play involving passive enjoyment of a thoroughly undisturbing and satisfying ritual) .
Much of TV has turned out to be
ritual play, including sit-coms, cop
shows, talk shows, perhaps even the
news. WOF is paradigmatic ritual
play, reduced to its minimalist essence. It is the perfect pseudoevent, a popular liturgical drama
that is all form and no content.
WOF is pure Eighties, a medium
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that is its own message, a synthetic
environment void of conflict or
self-criticism, almost a parody of itself in its very ritualism, and, yes, a
stately mime of the way life ought
to be.
Fred Friendly will be glad to
hear that shows such as Wheel of
Fortune worry me a bit, but not so
much for their mindlessness nor
even their celebration of greed.
WOF is another contemporary
example of our desire for self-enclosed worlds. Many Americans
seem to want to visit, live in, and
think about imaginary universes
with their own rules, apart from
participation in the messier and
meaner world of history. There is
an impulse to escape, to withdraw
into a utopia, to exclude problems
and differences in a neater and
prettier world of our own making.

Tapes of the show will
be publicly burned as a
lesson for young people.
Merv Griffin, Pat, and
Vanna will be jailed as
enemies of the state.
I have pondered this ever since
driving through Jim and Tammy
Bakker's PTL park outside of
Charlotte: it is a self-enclosed kingdom, clean and shiny and pure, a
simulated world of happy Christians doing good works and living
apart from the ills that beset us. I
couldn't get out of there fast
enough. I was reminded of William
James' visit to a Chautauqua, that
nineteenth-century equivalent of
fortress utopias: what a relief to
leave, he wrote, this tame and
jejune ice-cream soda order, a
stale and uninspiring place; he
preferred the imperfect world outside to the "atrocious harmlessness"
of Paradise. In a different way, our
daily entry into the puerile self-en-

closed world of WOF exercises the
same impulse. Pat and Vanna preside over a model universe, a play
world created by collective solipsism, the Elysian Fields of consumerism and communal good
feelings, far from mean streets and
teenage suicide and dead animals
on the highway.
So maybe the innocent turns out
to be demonic once again. The preposterous becomes sinister, and the
purely silly laden with consequences. If that is the case, then
Wheel of Fortune is antisocial, dangerous, seditious; it appeals to prurient interests such as greed, lust,
and the desire for atrocious
harmlessness. There is then only
one conclusion we can possibly
reach: WOF is pornographic. It
arouses in the viewer a bloodlust of
consumption, reduces woman to
sex object, manipulates wants
beyond our means, destroys motivation and a sense of reality, and
undoubtedly sends out hordes of
deranged people to rape, thieve,
kill, and buy.
Tell the Meese Commission to
stop contemplating hand-held vibrators and watch WOF. If the Supreme Court wants to see something with no redeeming social
value, let it forget Debbie Does Dallas
and tune in WOF instead. Byron
White, meet Vanna White. If you
two go out together, Sandra Day
O'Conner will have to go along and
chaperone to make sure that this
doesn't touch that. Let us boycott
the sponsors of WOF, and picket
the stations that carry it. All tapes
of the show will be publicly burned
as a lesson for young people. Merv
Griffin, Pat, and Vanna will be
jailed as enemies of the State.
As Vanna sits in her prison cell
awaiting execution, pale and drab
in her prison clothes, she can
rightly ask the priest, "Without me,
how will they ever solve the puzzle?" How indeed, Vanna, how indeed?
~=
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Thoughts on
Liberty Weekend
Albert R. Trost
Finding myself at home on Liberty Weekend this summer, with no
other big plans, I had to face the
dilemma of whether or not to partake of the staged events in New
York City. Cable News Network offered continuous coverage, while
ABC-TV covered the main events
of the weekend. My early inclination was not to watch. While I have
written and talked about civil religion in this journal and elsewhere,
I do not consider myself a believer.
The weekend looked to be the ultimate in civil religious rhetoric and
ritual, presided over by our current
high priest, President Reagan. For
me this was a weak inducement,
even considering both curiosity and
the academic pay-offs.
However, habit and inertia drew
me to about six hours of the TV
coverage. I was surprised at how
much of the daytime coverage avoided the ceremony and concentrated on the spectators. There was
a large dose of interviews, especially with people who were recent
immigrants, or who had a vivid pic-
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ture of their immigrant past. There
was usually a question in the interview about the meaning and significance of the statue in the New
York harbor. The spectator focus
was especially a feature of ABC's
coverage.
My response to all of this was
more contemplative than I would
have imagined. Since the weekend,
I have been thinking about the appropriateness and significance of
the Statue of Liberty as a symbol of
our nation's political values and institutions. Did it deserve the attention it received this past summer?
As the first symbol glimpsed by
many through the years who were
unfamiliar with our way of life and
political system, did it point to an
important reality about our country?
I have no qualifications to judge
the value of the form of the symbol, a woman with a crown, holding
a torch. I have come to the conclusion that the name and the concept
it embodies, liberty, is as good as
any to capture what is unique
about the United States in a world
of now some 160 other nations. I
have taught courses in comparative
government every semester for
over twenty years. Every semester I
face the task of taking the students
beyond the only political system
they supposedly know, the United
States, into foreign political territory. While there are similarities
among all the political systems of
the world, especially in the problems we face in a smaller and more
inter-dependent world, the uniqueness of American political institutions is still striking.
Very few nations have the list of
individual rights that we include in
the Constitution of the United
States, and a judicial system that is
fairly serious and effective in maintaining these rights. No nation has
an institution with the power and
broad responsibilities of our court
system, culminating in the U.S. Su-

preme Court and in the function of
judicial review. Outside of a few
other countries in our own hemisphere, the blend of a single executive as both chief of state and chief
of government with a real separation of powers among the executive,
legislative,
and
judicial
branches is very rare indeed.
Until the middle of this century,
the same claim of uniqueness could
have been made for our federal
system, dividing power between a
central government and the states.
Finally, a center-anchored, competitive two-party system is limited
to no more than a dozen nations in
the world besides the United States.
Another two dozen nations have
either a more polarized two-party
system than we do or a multi-party
system. Real competition in popular elections, adding all of these
situations together, is a feature of
only one in five nations in the
world. Real competition, combined
with the stability and consensus
that we have known, is a feature of
one in twenty.

Liberty is the paramount
political value of
American society.
Liberty or, as some prefer, freedom-especially defined in individual terms-is the paramount
political value of our society. This
cannot be said of many other nations. In fact, it is peculiar to nations who have descended from the
British, and even there it is not the
possession of the majority of these
national descendants. Coming out
of a unique historical experience
where strong central authority was
invested in the British monarch
long before it was achieved in other
national settings in Europe, the
British could concern themselves
with limiting the monarch's authority and granting rights to his subThe Cresset

jects while other nations concerned
themselves with establishing the
legitimacy of a monarch's authority
and the national community in the
first place.
British political philosophers like
Locke addressed the question of individual rights and freedoms well
before the establishment of the
United States. Political philosophers
on the continent of Europe concerned themselves more with concepts such as sovereignty, authority,
community (or fraternity), and
eventually equality. It was the
British concerns and tradition that
we inherited at the critical time of
the founding of our country. As
the insightful political historian
Louis Hartz has noted , the values
of individual freedom and rights
were the priorities of our earliest
immigrants, and by the time masses
of immigrants came from other
European nations, the liberal values
were so well-established that they
were not really challenged. In fact,
new immigrants accepted the transcendent value of liberty to gain the
acceptance of the elites who were
already running the country. The
United States has operated within
this liberal consensus ever since.
Community, authority, some would
say even equality and justice, have
been relatively minor themes within
our political value system.
As the intellectual descendants of
the British political tradition , the
American founders harbored a
deep suspicion of strong central authority. Though they realized the
need to unify the colonies and establish a new national identity and
central authority, most had no desire to return to the strong British
executive authority of their past.
The mechanism of protection written into the Constitution was to be
the division of powers, first within
the national government among
the three branches of that government, and then by dividing power
between the national government
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and the states, the arrangement
known as federalism . The greater
purpose this division of power was
to serve was to protect the individual from over-bearing governmental authority.

Community, authoritysome would say even
equality and justicehave been relatively
minor themes among us.
Americans thus took over the notion of the social contract, the idea
that government should be limited
to those functions and policies that
serve the best interests of the individuals under its authority. The
concept of social contract combined
with the doctrine of natural rights
that had been influential on the
continent of Europe and eventuated in the first ten amendments
to the U.S. Constitution, the socalled Bill of Rights. These were
also seen as further limitations on
the powers of government. This is
not to say that the continental understanding of natural rights had
the kind of individual focus it assumed in the United States. The
tendency to interpret rights in individual terms was reinforced by
nineteenth-century British political
developments and the thought of
nineteenth-century British social
philosophers John Stuart Mill and
Herbert Spencer. The narrow social
class range of our early immigrants
and the vastness of the American
frontier can also be credited with
the growth of individualism.
Concern with personal liberty
and the growth of political parties
with this emphasis spread through
Western Europe and Latin America
by the middle of the nineteenth
century, but the idea of individual
freedoms never became as dominant in these countries as it was in

the United Kingdom, Canada, and
the United States. In fact, in most
countries it never spread beyond
the platforms of one or two political parties in the society, usually
known as the Liberal Party or the
Radical Party. In most of the party
systems and political cultures of the
world, liberties or rights mean the
rights of some collectivity like the
working class, the people, the nation, or political parties. Thus the
working class is guaranteed employment, or the people are promised decent housing and nourishment, or the church ts giVen
privileges. While some nations
imply that individuals or minorities
have freedom of speech or freedom of the press or the right to assemble, it is very unusual to find
the rights of persons stated as they
are in Amendments two through
nine of the U.S. Constitution. Even
in the United Kingdom one does
not find such an extensive statement of rights of individuals, and
certainly not the enforcement of
those rights.
Related to the ability to protect
the rights of individuals and
minonues is another unique feature of the American political system, the independence and power
of the judiciary. This is epitomized
in the Supreme Court, especially in
its exercise of the function of judicial review. Judicial review includes
the power of American courts to
review or judge the actions of the
other branches of the government
with regard to their conformance
to the United States Constitution.
Parliamentary systems like the
United Kingdom find the grant of
such power to an independent
judiciary incompatible with the notion of parliamentary supremacy.
In these systems parliament is the
only and final law-giver; in fact in
most systems parliament also writes
and amends the constitution itself.
In non-parliamentary systems, like
those found in most of Latin
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America, the judiciary is not independent enough of the government
of the day to exercise such power.
I n several recent constitutions like
those of West Germany and France,
attempts have been made to set up
bodies to interpret the respective
constitutions. The problem is that
these institutions exist outside the
regular court systems of the respective countries. They lack the political independence of the rest of the
judiciary and they lack the prestige
of a long-established institution.
There has been no action comparable in effect to that of a Supreme
Court decision like Miranda v.
Arizona (restriction on police arrest
procedures) or Engel v. Vitale (the
school prayer decision) which overturns legislative and executive actions because they are unconstitutional.
In most of the world, the legislative and executive branches are
fused under a parliamentary system of government. In the few
dozen nations that make an attempt at separation of powers and
a presidential system, the legislature is a weak and compliant partner with the executive. There is
nothing in the world comparable to
the independence and power of the
United States Congress, a power
that has often even led to a deadlock because of the strong constitutional positions of both the legislative and executive branches. This
can be seen in the yearly struggle
over the budget, a spectacle unlikely to be seen anywhere else in
the world.
A final unique feature of the
American political system that may
be the most significant for our
political stability but is also indirectly related to concern with liberty is our center-rooted, two-party
system. Competitive political systems of any kind are in a minority
in the world. One-party systems
and military regimes dominate,
especially in the third world and
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Eastern Europe. Most of Western
Europe has multi-party competition
with a high degree of polarization
and governmental instability. A few
nations in Latin America have or
have had such systems, as has
Japan. Two-party systems are
pretty much limited to the heirs of
the British political tradition, New
Zealand, Australia, Canada, and
the United States. A few other nations with two-party systems like
Venezuela and West Germany can
be explained also by the conscious
attempt to borrow political institutions from Britain or the United
States.

The Statue of Liberty
is a fitting symbol of
our political uniqueness,
a uniqueness that might
even grow in the future.

However, two-party systems are
very difficult to maintain. The
major threat is the polarization of
the ideological spectrum and party
positions on it. One party tends to
drift right, the other left, vacating
the center. A third party arises to
occupy the deserted center. This is
presently happening in Great Britain and may also be the fate of
Australia and New Zealand in the
near future. Another possibility is
for the polarization to occur, but
for the two traditional parties not
to move from the center and for
new parties to arise on their left or
right. This could happen in West
Germany with the new Green
Party, or in Canada with the New
Democratic Party.
The United States, even in the
Great Depression, was able to hold
a two-party system anchored in the
center of the ideological spectrum.
One party may drift a little to the
right (or the left) as the Republicans have done recently, but the

other party drifts with it, or the
drift is corrected in the next national election. The reasons for
America's success in maintaining
the two-party system are complex,
but one important cause is that our
political elites share a commitment
to liberalism, meaning here the virtues of individual freedom. The
two political parties share this commitment. Ideologies to the right
and left have never been able to
challenge this liberal consensus,
which has existed since before the
founding of the nation.
The Statue of Liberty is a fitting
symbol of our political uniqueness,
a uniqueness that might even grow
in the future. Though we hear a
lot of rhetoric about human rights
and human rights groups, for most
of the world this Is more a
synonym for a collective human
dignity than for the kind of individual and procedural rights that
we prize. For most nations, our
liberties are a luxury associated
with affluence and political stability
that they cannot afford. It is literally beyond their means. Its value
over against other political values
like equality, social justice, and national self-determination has slipped for many political leaders
around the world. Like colonial
empires, it is seen by many as a
feature of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and North
America, important in its time and
for its residual effects today, but
out-dated.
Hopefully some of our citizens
got beyond the hype, the ritual,
and the big-name entertainment
that attended Liberty Weekend . If
they recognized the uniqueness of
our political values and institutions,
they might be able to reflect
thoughtfully on the questions much
of the rest of the world has about
their continued importance. Such
introspection would justify the expense in money and time of the
weekend's festivities.
ell
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An English
Film Revival
Richard Maxwell
It is easy to think of the English
movie industry as a freak encounter among a few picturesque
geniuses. An encounter: not, however, a tradition or anything approaching it. Charles Laughton,
Alec Guinness, and the Beatles all
made or appeared in memorable
films , but none of them is primarily
a film star. Hitchcock (we are told)
had to go to America to become a
great director. Furthermore, since
a brief period of prosperity in the
Sixties, most of the best British
films have been made for TV. Little wonder that moviegoers have
been inclined to agree with Truffaut's sneaky comment that England and film are two irreconcilable
ideas.
With the degeneration of the
French tradition that Truffaut
and his friends established, England looks better and better. Margaret Thatcher and Monty Python
share credit for this development
about equally: Thatcher because
she provided her country with interesting times, Python because itor they--demonstrated that peculiarly English humor could make
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money m the United States. The
result was that, along with the obligatory costume dramas (Ghandi),
we started to get movies like A
Private Function-probably the
most satisfying comedy from any
source last year and (no coincidence) a perfect exemplification
of my argument.
The lucky people who saw it will
recall that Function concerns food
rationing in Britain shortly after
World War II, not, I suppose, a
subject to titillate millions. Michael
Palin (of Python) plays a podiatrist
or a foot manicurist-it's a little
hard to say which-whose shrewish
wife (Maggie Smith) wants to rise
in the social scale. She is unable to
do so until she nags her husband
into stealing a pig-the very pig
which the local elite are illegally
raising to be served at a banquet in
celebration of the royal wedding.
This all sounds very P.G. Wadehouse, but whereas Wodehouse's
romps are innocent Function has a
disabused notion of human nature.
The movie traces relationships
between a biological fact (appetite)
and a social situation (fights over
social status in a time of economic
scarcity). I particularly recommend
the scene where Maggie Smith bargains with the local doctor-elegantly dressed, chairman of the banquet committee-about the pig's
uncertain future. Thatcher and
Monty Python couldn't have met
any more fruitfully than they do in
this grim dialogue, or in the farce
of which it is part.
Among the English films I have
seen more recently, the nearest to
Function is My Beautiful Laundrette.
In this case, the success on which
all else depends is a superb script.
Hanif Kureishi writes largely about
Pakistanis in present-day London,
but uses his specialized knowledge
to analyze the workings of a society. The protagonist is Omar (Gordon Warnecke), a Pakistani boy living "on the dole" with his father, a

washed-up alcoholic journalist who
spends his days in bed.
This hopeless derelict calls an enterprising brother (Saeed Jeffrey)
who has made a fortune running a
garage-and also, as we soon discover, working the drug trade. The
brother offers his Omar a job
cleaning up cars. Soon the young
polisher graduates to other activities. He helps out on a drug
transaction, thus accumulating the
capital-and the brownie points-to
renovate a half-ruined laundrette
owned by his family. Around this
experiment in capitalism accumulate the social, familial, and racial
jealousies of at least twelve significant characters.
Much is made of a love affair between Omar and Johnny (Daniel
Day Lewis, of a distinguished literary family), an indigenous thug
who belongs to a racist gang. The
two are said to have been childhood friends. Johnny wants out of
his futile life wandering around intimidating people or being intimidated in return. It is he who effects
the drug sale which allows the
laundrette's renovation. It is he
who acts as carpenter and painter.
Evidently Omar becomes a
capitalist exploiter. He provides the
property and the ideas; someone
else does the dirty work. But seldom has the relation between
capitalist and worker been more
slyly--one might say, more erotically--depicted. Johnny is willing to
be exploited, partly because he is
desperate for a job and partly because his hunger for his friend's
body is unstoppable. There are the
beginnings of an allegory in this
situation, but Kureishi has the tact
not to push his arguments too far.
The American film Desert Hearts
provides a good point of reference
because it also depicts a homosexual love affair, yet insists idiotically
that sex is a thing-in-itself, a be-all
and end-all, rather than part of a
larger social and biological pattern.
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Kureishi doesn't have to take up
the burden of constantly reassuring
us that Sex is Good. Instead he
works matter-of-factly towards a set
of observations on a love affair and
its implications m a particular
world.
The film as a whole has this
same quality of witty detachment,
detachment that allows us to sympathize with everyone a little without losing a comprehensive view of
what's happening. Only one character, Omar's older cousin, is played
as an irredeemable heavy and even
he has a few moments of his own:
there is a delightful scene where he
throws cash around and seedylooking Anglo-Saxon types, minor
men of letters or something, have
to get down and pick it up.
Another ineffective intellectual,
the boy's father, gets what may be
Kureishi's last word: showing up
for the grand opening of the laundrette (but at three in the morning
rather than the afternoon: wrong
again!) he ends up talking with his
son's lover, discoursing on life's disappointments. Education is necessary, he notes, because you have to
know who is doing what to you . My
Beautiful Laundrette tries to prepare
its viewer for this kind of education . It succeeds.
In a couple of artsy cities where
I spent some time this summer
(Austin and Chapel Hill) the most
popular "art" film was a new production of the Ivory-Merchant
team, an adaptation of E.M. Forster's Room with a View. I usually
hate film adaptations of novels, at
least if the novels are any good, but
Room is a special case. It is short,
light-hearted, arranged in scenes,
and frequently dependent on scenery. Such a book is appropriate material for a good two-hour movie.
A craftsmanlike script by the
novelist Ruth Prawer Jhabavlia
helps towards this goal. She drops
much of the novel's commentary
on religion-a semi-tragic subplot
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concerning baptism is gone-but
preserves the brilliantly-arranged
story of a young girl's transformation by experiences in Italy and her
later attempts to deny that anything important has happened to
her, that travelling (in some generous meaning of the word) can actually change you .

Needless to say that the
plot is rigged. Forster
assures us, quite
frankly, that his
characters are watched
over by the Comic Muse.
She also retains Forster's chapter
titles, which suggest the kind of wit
on which the book depends, so we
get: The Reverend Arthur Beebe, the
Reverend Cuthbert Eager, Mr. Emerson, Mr. George Emerson, Miss
Eleanor Lavish,
Miss
Charlotte
Bartlett, and Miss Lucy Honeychurch,
Drive out in Carriages to See a View:
Italians Drive Them, and similar
drolleries throughout. To put the
point another way, there is enough
of Forster's voice here to make the
comic tableaux almost uniformly
affecting.
Northern Europeans used to love
travelling in Italy and receiving
what they thought-what may really have been-an education of the
senses. Forster's novel, and the
Merchant-Ivory film right along
with it, manages to revivify a cliche.
It does so by making distinctions,
by suggesting that people might get
different things from a trip to the
Mediterranean, depending on their
readiness and their luck. Lucy
Emerson, the heroine, gets a few
surprises: she watches a man die in
a public square and later is kissed
in a field by impulsive George
Emerson. Miss Lavish, a bad
novelist, gets the locale and decor
for a bad novel. Cecil, who be-

comes Lucy's fiance once she returns to England, gets what he supposes is "subtlety."
Since it is only Lucy who has received anything really new, the
false gifts are used to reveal the
true one. Lucy has to see that Cecil
is a confused and vague person
rather than a masterful man of the
world; it is his mockery of Miss
Lavish's silly novel (which turns out
to contain the incident of Lucy
being kissed by George) that turns
her away from her engagement at
a crucial moment. The tale ends
very satisfactorily with the right
people marrying each other, after
which they return to Italy for their
honeymoon.
Needless to say that the plot is
rigged: Forster assures us, quite
frankly, . that his characters are
watched over by the Comic Muse.
What makes one rigged plot better
than another? As Lucy Honeychurch, lush Helen Bonham-Carter helps a lot. She struggles about
somnabulistically, stunned by one
violation of propriety after another.
She is convincing in the role of a
delicious young person whose passions have somehow been put to
sleep or sublimated completely into
art. As the clergyman Mr. Beebe
observes, when Lucy starts living
her life the way she plays Beethoven, there will be considerable
excitement. And there is. BonhamCarter is ever more delicious and
ever more confused as her world
collapses in on her. She becomes
the center of something like an Edwardian psychomachia, a struggle for
a soul articulated by several brilliant performances.
Maggie Smith as Lucy's frustrated aunt (and chaperone on the
first visit to Italy) is particularly
good, lean and drawn-out like a
piece of anxious beef jerky; as
Cecil, Daniel Day Lewis-less certain of what he wanted than he was
as Johnny in My Beautiful Laundrette--conveys the horror of his
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pseudosophisticated pose, so that
we feel the character's sufferings as
well as his imposition on Lucy;
Denholm Eliot as the old Mr.
Emerson is still playing Jarndyce of
Bleak House, but why not? It suits
him, and suits the part. I should
add, for the prurient or the curious, that this film contains an extended interlude of full frontal
male nudity straight out of the
book.
The film I enjoyed most this
summer was Labyrinth, presented in
the ads as a creation of producer
George Lucas, Jim Henson (of the
Muppets), and aging English rock
star David Bowie. Another important contribution comes from illustrator Brian Froud, who must have
worked closely with Henson, butas in the films considered aboveno one's work is more fundamental
than the scriptwriter's. In a recent
monograph, Chaucer's Knight, Terry
Jones argues that the supposedly
noble knight of The Canterbury Tales
is really a base mercenary. Jones'
assertion is highly debatable, but
his knowledge of medieval warfare
is so thorough that he almost convinces the unwary reader (me).
Is this the sort of mind that
could cook up a good fantasy film
for children? Apparently it is. The
underrated Monty Python and the
Meaning of Life demonstrated that
Jones had a considerable talent for
organizing a miscellany of comic incidents; Labyrinth fulfills the promise of the earlier film. Jones draws
considerably on Lewis Carroll ; he
manages to approximate the tone
of the Alice books without ever
borrowing directly from them.
What we have here, in fact, is the
first-and probably last-successful
Carrollian film.
This is not to say that the film is
exclusively based on Carroll; Jones
is superb as a patcher-together of
other people' ideas into a plausible
whole. His plot works from a familiar fairy-tale premise. Sarah QenSeptember, 1986

nifer Connelly), a teenage girl jealous of a baby brother--or halfbrother-is stuck one night babysitting the kid ; she wishes out loud
that the goblins would come and
get him. They do. The baby, Toby,
is the offspring of Brian Froud
but-as attired in the fine striped
red suit provided for him-appears
to have been designed by Maurice
Sendak, an eminence among contemporary children's illustrators.
Appropriately
enough,
our
heroine is stuck in a situation reminiscent of Sendak: like the protagonist of his Higglety-Pigglety-Pop,
she is given responsibility for an
obnoxious child and almost-but
not quite-allows him to perish
(strictly speaking, to become a goblin). References to the film version
of The Wizard of Oz also figure
prominently; Sarah moves through
a dream world which recalls her
real life, picking up odd friends
along the way. At the very end, M.
C. Escher's labyrinth-pictures enter
in too: the maze, which has been
an endless alley, a network of
caverns, a formal hedge-garden,
and a forest (among other things)
becomes one of Escher's mystifying
and contradictory spaces where
people seem to move in conflicting

dimensions.
With all this baggage, however,
the Alice atmosphere never gets
lost. Though the girl and her parents are depicted as an American
family, the labyrinth couldn't be
more English and more Carrollian.
Jones catches perfectly the feeling
of Alice's dizzying progress. On
first entering the labyrinth-at
whose center she hopes to find the
unfortunate Toby-she encounters
a goblin gardener exterminating
faeries with insect spray . . . and
learns the hard way that he is quite
right to be annihilating the nasty
little things. (Cf. the odd excursus
on insects and their deaths offered
by the giant Gnat of Through the
Looking-Glass.) There is the same
strange mathematical dream-logic
as in Alice, with Sarah at one point
being called upon to solve a riddle
of the "All Cretans are liars" variety.
The characters in the labyrinth
are English eccentrics at heart and
in voice, with Bowie-the goblin
king-as a brooding Byronic eminence who terrorizes them all. (He
acts this part well.) At one point we
are allowed an overhead view of
the labyrinth and see Sarah and
Carroll's Red Knight almost bump
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into each other. At the last moment
they take different turns-which is
the film's way of saying that there
are many possibilities within the
maze, many threads that can be followed through it. Because Jones
has the intelligence to imitate Carroll without parroting him, this
kind of declaration is convincing.
Also convincing is the sexual subtext, with Bowie wooing our
heroine: tempting her to think that
she's a little older than she is. He
wants to accomplish her imaginative seduction (at least). One issue
in this labyrinth IS thus the
treacherous connection between
fantasy and early teenage sexuality.
This is a useful variant on Carroll's
weirder sexual preoccupations. I
can't recall another case where a
great writer has been drawn upon
so refreshingly in a movie. Jones
brings Carroll into the twentieth
century, an extraordinary accomplishment.
Henson and (if I recall correctly)
Froud have done good work before
in fantasy films; The Dark Crystal
was a pleasure to view and would
have been a pleasure to hear if
only it hadn't been so schmaltzy.
Our brilliant designers-not to
mention our clever producershave long needed some educated
persons to work with them. These
English films are wonderful not
only because of the excellent scripts
I have emphasized, and not only
because of the skilled acting and
art direction used to realize the
scripts, but because there is in each
case a genuinely literary intelligence conceiving and shaping the
material. At the present moment
intelligence of this kind is rare in
the world of movies. And while literature and film have sometimes
seemed as irreconcilable as England
and film, just now the three
categories seem to have merged.
Perhaps, in the long run, it is this
conjunction which will define the
tradition of English cinema.
~=
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Offenders
John Steven Paul
Officially, they're called offenders.
Not inmates, or prisoners, or convicts,
but offenders. The label refers not
to place or social status but to action. Perhaps that is why they're
able to recognize Oedipus, or Macbeth, or Willy Loman more quickly
and clearly than others do. Tragedians have always written and acted
out stories about offenders and the
inevitable consequences of the actions that have brought them low.
Recently, I was asked to lead a
discussion of Arthur Miller's Death
of a Salesman. The play was to be
read and discussed as part of an
educational series at the Westville
Correctional Center in Westville,
Indiana. The participants were offenders incarcerated at the Center.
After listening to an introductory
presentation on the play by Dr.
Anita Bowser of Purdue University's North Central campus, about
twenty men and I talked about Miller's famous drama for about an
hour.
It was easy, after a short time, to
forget that these men were serving
sentences for offenses ranging
from burglary to drug dealing to
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murder. For many of them, their
crimes or criminal personalities will
keep them in prison for much of
their lives. (Though Westville is officially a medium security facility,
circumstances have dictated that it
house offenders requiring maximum security incarceration.) Their
faces did not reflect a particular
criminal type; on the contrary,
most of these faces would have
blended perfectly with those in a
restaurant, a shopping mall, or a
college classroom. The racial division between white and black was
roughly even. Several of the men
were very articulate; some had
been educated at the college level;
all were thoughtful, earnest, and
respectful of the discussion process
and one another.
Some of the men had probably
come to the program because, unlike their sleeping rooms, the educational building is air-conditioned.
Perhaps others came to demonstrate their good behavior. Still
others came in search of mental activity, for a chance to explore
something beyond the fences and
walls of their own physical circumstances.
They
represented
three of the Correctional Center's
educational programs: the college
level program, the vocational education program, and the general
education diploma program. The
educational program is under the
general supervision of Dr. Shannon
Reffett, a remarkably determined
and energetic man who strives to
provide the offenders with a program of humanistic as well as vocational studies. The key word in that
sentence is provide; nearly every
other aspect of prison life is dominated by the word deprive.
This column is not meant to be
an essay on Death of a Salesman,
though we could well consider the
recent television production starring Dustin Hoffman, which I
think will be the definitive production of the play for the last part of
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the twentieth century. Nor will it be
exploration of a kind of real life
counterpart for Jack Henry Abbott's In the Belly of the Beast,
though, undoubtedly, some of the
men in the discussion group would
recognize the events and ideas in
that play from personal experience.
Rather, what I would like to
explore is the apparently unique
congruence between this particular
group of readers and Death of a
Salesman. Martin Esslin has written
that the first audience in the
United States to truly understand
the meaning of Samuel Beckett's
Waiting for Godot- a play that had
mystified audiences in Miami and
New York- was comprised of inmates at San Quentin prison. In retrospect, the correspondence between the meaninglessness of
prison life and that of the dawdling
Didi and Gogo is obvious. The fundamental connection between Miller's drama and a group of prisoners would not have seemed so
clear.
The amount of light brought by
the text to these men, and by the
men to the text, to one another,
and to the discussion leader was remarkable. The nature of my experience at the prison - a situation
with which I was both superficially
familiar (text, students, discussion)
and profoundly alien - was sufficiently jarring to give me a fresh
view of the interaction between a
group of persons and a text. Only
one member of the group had seen
a production of the play, which , as
a reading text, presents special obstacles to the inexperienced playreader. Yet, the discussion of Death
of a Salesman demonstrated that the
majority
of participants
had
traversed the distance between
themselves and the text with remarkable facility .
Below are some of the questions
raised by the discussants which, while
I have not been able to quote verbatim , I have paraphrased in the
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tone and style of the questioner.
Following each question, I have
summarized a bit of the discussion
that it generated and my own commentary.
Is this play a Tragedy? I mean, it reminds me of Oedipus because Willy fell
down from a high place.
This question startled me, because critics and students of Death
of a Salesman have been asking it
since the play was first staged in
1949. It seems that the generic
status of Death of a Salesman has always been at issue. Some critics say
that Willy's victimization, his ultimate inability to see through the
rose-colored blinders of his dream
of a good life, and the play's extreme sadness place it squarely in
the tradition of sentimental melodrama. Arthur Miller himself responded that the stuff of tragedy is
a human being's willingness to lay
down his life to secure his sense of
personal dignity. The importance
of the question itself is debatable.
If a play is entertaining, moving,
meaningful, enlightening, what
does it matter to what genre
academic critics assign it? Yet it
continues to be asked, even at the
Westville Correctional Center.

If a play entertains,
moves, and enlightens
us, what does it matter
to which genre academic
critics assign it?
Twenty years before the play was
staged, the intemperately pessimistic Joseph Wood Krutch declared
that there could be no Tragedy in
the modern world. The estimable
critic and social philosopher had no
doubt that poets with the gifts of
Sophocles and Shakespeare could
be born. He despaired rather of
peo ple's ability, in the age of Darwtman biology and moral relativism , to distinguish between the

higher and lower forms of life, or
between the nobler and commoner
classes of human being. Thus,
Krutch implied that labeling a play
a Tragedy reflects the assumptions
of the community more than the
substance of the work in question.
There was a dispute in our discussion
group-community over
Willy's status as a Tragic hero. He
didn't fall from any high place. He was
never a success. He was always low,
said one member of the group.
And, even by his own reckoning,
Willy was never a highly successful
salesman. In the original stage production, Lee J. Cobb, a large, rawboned man, enacted the role. In
the television production (which is
the version of the play that most
people are likely to see), the salesman is enacted by Dustin Hoffman,
a little banty rooster of a man who
has not even his stature to counter
the charge that he is just a small
man incapable of tragic nobility.
But the consensus of the Westville group was that Willy's story is
tragic. There were moments, at
least as Willy remembers them,
when he was about as noble as you
get in this culture. On top of the
world out in the yard of his own
home, the object of his sons' devotion and his wife's love and admiration, Willy exudes success. And at
this point we sense noble determination rather than piteous delusion. It was a mighty fall from
there to the toilet of Frank's Chop
House, where Willy spent the evening of his last day on earth.
The present action of Death of a
Salesman takes place within the last
twenty-four hours of a man's life.
This aspect of its form would have
satisfied the neo-classical critics who
demanded that dramatic poets follow Aristotle and restrict the time
of their tragedies to no more than
one day's time. When the ancient
Greek tragedians dramatized Agamemnon's or Oedipus' or Phaedra's
last day, they focused their audi-
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ence's attention on the hero in extremis, at the time of a final accounting of his life. Perhaps it is
the tragic self in extremis that the
Westville offenders recognized.
On his last "today" the tragic
hero sees to what the yesteryears of
his life have led. The chorus rehearses the events of his life in
their mythic and historic context.
Thus, the audience as well as the
hero himself suffer through a compressed version of Willy's life in its
entirety. On his last day, Willy's
chorus is his own memory. His present is in dialogue with his past.
I found the play hard to follow because
I didn't know when it was in the past
and when it was in the present.

I have read and seen this play so
many times I often forget that Miller's form posed difficulties for audiences and readers in 1949 and continues to do so. On the stage, the
materialization of Willy's memory is
somewhat easier to grasp than in
reading (especially if the reader has
a habit of skipping the italicized
stage directions). The theatre of the
imagination functions only with a
great deal of practice.
The form was, of course, one of
the signal innovations of Death of a
Saksman, marking an important development beyond the naturalism of
much of pre-1949 American drama
(including Miller's own All My
Sons) and consciously non-realistic
drama such as Thornton Wilder's
Our Town. The action of this play,
which Miller wished initially to
title Inside His Head, takes place at
various circles of Willy's consciOusness. The action ripples
from one circle to another and
from one time frame to another
as if disturbed by a sound, a word,
a laugh.
The recent television production,
directed by Volker Schlondorff,
employed more typically cinematic
techniques to indicate the location
of the action. Faces, scenes, and
voices from Willy's past emanated
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from the ends of tunnel-like hallways, smeared windows, and from
behind closed doors. Scenes such as
the office of Willy's boss Howard,
his neighbor Charley's office, the
Boston hotel room where he met
his other woman and later Biff,
and Frank's Chop House where
Biff and Happy left him imprisoned by his memory seemed to
have been shot at remote locations.
But when the camera pulled back
to open the shot, we could see that
the walls of these buildings were
painted flats, not consistently
joined at the corners or topped by
ceilings. As far as I know, the use
of the flats was a telecinematic innovation and it is interesting if not
entirely logical.
On stage, there is only the
simplest technical device to locate
the action: an invisible line that
separates the main stage from the
forestage. When Willy crosses that
line he is in his memory. Those remembered persons make their entrances from the wings, and the
necessary scenery is a simple chair,
a table, a desk, or a bed. The action passes from Willy's imagination to the audience's. The latter's
imagination must be as active and
fertile as the former's.
The reader, who has not even
the simple stage convention, experiences Willy's past and present
achronologically and at times simultaneously-as in the scene in which
Willy's brother Ben "intrudes,"
from a distance of seventeen years,
upon the card game between Willy
and his next-door neighbor Charley. The text of the play is a
scenario for stage action, but it is
also the image of a man's consciousness.
Doubtless, the Westville discussion group comprehended Willy's
increasing detachment from the
surrounding reality. Unlike their
physical isolation, which at some
point happened suddenly, Willy's
mental isolation came upon him

gradually, until by the end of his
last day he was completely alone. It
is the alienation of Willy's self that
enables his consciousness to mutate
as easily as it does. There comes a
point where he no longer wants to
return to the world of objective reality.

There comes a point where

Willy no longer wants
to return to the world
of objective reality.
What was it exactly that Willy did
that was so bad? Why did Biff hate his
father?

There are simple and complex
answers to that question. Biff had
failed a required math course
which meant that he couldn't
graduate
from
high
school.
Panicky, the boy traveled to Boston
where his father was selling the
company line. To Biff, Willy was
ominscient and omnipotent, the
man who could make anything better with a smile and a pat on the
back. At his father's hotel in Boston, Biff found Willy with another
woman in his room. The shock of
his father's infidelity to his mother
so traumatized Biff that he was unable to rebound emotionally.
If I found my father in bed with
another woman I wouldn't take it with
such ill-feeling.

The comment may say much
about the distance between 1949
and 1986 and also the distance between Biffs age seventeen and the
age of the man who made the comment (I would guess about 35-40).
Marital infidelity today is probably
more common, or at least more
acknowledged, than it was in 1949.
And no doubt it is more common
for a child to see his father with
another woman at an earlier age.
The other woman may be his second wife or girlfriend, her presence legitimized by a divorce. And
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certainly, in 1986, Americans have
fewer illusions about the sanctity
and the transcendent value of the
nuclear family than they did in
1949.
The other woman in the hotel
room undermined more than Biffs
confidence in his father's faithfulness to his mother. If Death of a
Salesman is the story of Willy's rejection of reality, it is also the story
of Biffs crisis of faith. For Biff,
Willy was the ground of being; he
took the place of God. Every word
Willy said to his son had the force
of a proverb or a commandment,
from the business world maxims"The man who makes an appearance in the business world, the man
who creates personal interest, is the
man who gets ahead"-to the winkof-an-eye suggestions that his boys
steal building materials and sports
equipment and cheat on examinations. To Biffs eyes, his father was
a vision of happiness and the
good life sparkling like crystal.
When Biff discovered his father's
flaw, the vision shattered, and in
the seventeen years since he has
been unable even to find the
pieces.
Once the Westville group had
agreed that the father-son relationship is the axis upon which the play
turns, the discussion became totally
inclusive. Everyone in the room
had a father; everyone was a son.
I have three sons. When I get out of
here, how are we going to deal with the
fact of my crime, my incarceration? I
can't just pretend it never happened. I
can't leave it out of the story.
Willy Loman was a salesman who
would not admit even the possibility of the slightest flaw in his
goods. He sold as if his life depended on it; and, most certainly,
it did, for Willy was selling himself.
How do we, as fathers, the Westville group wondered, disclose our
imperfections to our sons who look
to us as the perfect model for the
human being? How do we tell them
September, 1986

we're not perfect, without wrecking
their faith in goodness?
My father is a supervisor at the Ford
Motor Company in Detroit. I always
looked up to him as the perfect man.
Maybe that's why I could never talk to
him. Until this very moment, I could
never see him as he really was: just a
man-my father, but just a man.
Today, right this minute, I understand
him better than I ever did.
Biff bought his father's success
vehicle without asking any questions, without even checking under
the hood. At the bitterest moment
of self-loathing, Biff is still able to
refer to his father as a prince, "a
fine, troubled prince." And the
Westville group wondered, how do
we deal with our fathers' imperfections? How do we respect them and
learn from them without sacrificing
our own integrity?
In his recent book Salesman in
Beijing, Arthur Miller recounts his
experience directing Death of a
Sa_lesman with Chinese actors in a
theatre in the Chinese capital. The
book makes fascinating reading
and should be required for anyone
about to direct the play. Miller says
that he undertook this very problematic and risky project to assert
the existence of a single humanity
that transcends national and cultural barriers.
After sharing Death of a Salesman
with the offenders at Westville Correctional Center, I heard Miller's
remark ringing in my ear. The two
experiences were, of course, very
different. These men are Americans and I'm sure that many of
them have a background not entirely different from my own. We
all speak the same language, and
we share the same cultural assumptions. Yet the prison wall is erected
to divide human beings from one
another. The convicted are on the
inside, the unconvicted on the outside. But for the wall we would all
be together in one world, as one
humanity, all of us offenders. ••

••

Review Essay

The Zero
Generation
Linda & Thomas Noer

Less Than Zero
By Bret Ellis. New York: Simon &
Schuster. 208 pp. $15.95.
American writers and filmmakers
have repeatedly focused on the
problems and values of youth. Scott
Fitzgerald and Ernest Hemingway
wrote of a "lost generation" cut off
from the past by World War I. A
generation later, J. D. Salinger
created Holden Caulfield to represent misunderstood and confused
teenagers after another war. Benjamin in the film The Graduate became to many the symbol of disenchanted youth during the turbulent
1960s. Journalist Tom Wolfe dubbed
the 1970s the "me decade" and argued that young people had aban-
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doned their commitment to improve society in order instead to
concentrate on improving their
own bodies and bank accounts.
Last year Bret Ellis offered a
new look at "troubled youth " in his
best-selling novel , Less Than Zero.
Ellis' book forces adults to reevaluate their assumptions about
the values and goals of America's
adolescents. It should be of particular concern to college teachers and
administrators dealing with young
people in the mid-1980s.
Although it may appear to be
similar to earlier attempts to describe alienated youth, Less Than
Zero is different in many ways. Ellis
is not an adult mu sing on the turmoils of the "younger generation";
he is writing about his peers. He
was a 20-year-old junior at Bennington College when Less Than
Zero was published.
Even more significant, the characters in his book do not reject old
values for new ones; they lack any
clear values or comm~tment at all
and do not desire to acquire any.
They are not in revolt against the
past or in revolt against anything.
They have none of the innocence
of Holden Caulfield, none of the
anger of the Sixties' radicals, and
none of the energy of the
materialists of the 1970s. They are
unemotional, uninvolved, uncommitted, uncaring, and more than a
bit frightening.
The novel centers on Clay, an
18-year-old freshman at an unnamed New Hampshire college
who "returns to his home in Los
Angeles for Christmas break. (Los
Angeles is also Ellis' home town.)
During his month of vacation, Clay
drifts from parties to rock concerts,
from fancy bars to fast-food restaurants. His world is dominated by
drugs, rock videos, violence, joyless
sexual encounters (both straight
and gay), and boredom. As Clay
drives aimlessly along the freeways
of Southern California, he passively
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notes the moral emptiness and selfdestructiveness of his generation.
Clay is an observer. He rarely
judges or acts. The dominant verb
in Less Than Zero is "stare." Clay
stares at but does not respond to
even the most violent and repulsive
events. He stands silently as his
friends laugh and mock the body
of a dead 16-year-old heroin addict
they find in an alley. He watches,
but does not intervene, as his best
friend drifts into homosexual prostitution. With no emotion he views
the gang rape of a bound and
drugged 12-year-old girl. The
reader feels the horror of his environment, but Clay is only a
numbed observer. His response to
all he sees is to sniff cocaine and
stare at rock videos on MTV.

Although Clay appears
to be nearly without
emotion, he is the only
character in the book
who reflects on his life.
All that matters in Clay's world is
to have a good suntan, to be dressed
in the most recent style, and to
know the "in" rock groups. The
characters in Less Than Zero are introduced with descriptions of their
tan, their clothing, their hairstyle:
these constitute their significance.
As Clay is told, "You are a very
beautiful boy, and here, that's all
that matters."
Although Clay appears to be
nearly without emotion, he is the
only character in the book ever to
reflect on his life and to consider
its bleakness. As he drifts from Beverly Hills to Malibu, from Ma
Maison to McDonalds, Clay occasionally is nudged from his complacency. It is billboards and TV that
provoke his rare thoughts on life.
On the first page of the novel,
Clay's lover, Blair, mentions that
"people are afraid to merge on the

freeways to L. A." Repeatedly Clay
recalls her comment that "people
are afraid to merge." Driving the
freeways he sees a billboard that
says "Disappear Here"; this image
too recurs throughout the book.
Another sign asks "Wonder if he's
for sale?" and Clay considers
whether everything and everyone is
"for sale." His room is dominated
by a poster of rock star Elvis Costello, with eyes that stare out the
window and the word "trust" written on top. Clay wonders if Costello sees any "trust."
Television
provides
another
stimulant that provokes Clay briefly
to consider his life. Late at night he
flips his remote control to a program of religious evangelists. One
promises a miracle for the viewer.
Clay waits for an hour for his miracle. When nothing happens, he
"does a line of coke" and goes to
the Polo Lounge for a drink.
Despite these rare reflections,
Clay remains cut off from any commitments or human interaction.
Neither young nor old offer him
trust or love, and Clay responds in
kind. He has no real friends, only
people to party with. When his
closest "friend," Julian, is forced
into prostitution to pay off his drug
debt, Clay accompanies him on a
"date" with a middle-aged salesman
from Indiana. Clay stares at their
sexual copulating without comment. His only wish is that he
could turn on the stereo.
His family also has little to offer
Clay. Adults are nearly non-existent in the book. Many of the
young people have no idea where
their parents are. Kim thinks her
mother is in London until she
reads in Variety that she is in
Hawaii. Daniel tells Clay his parents are shopping in Japan or
"maybe in Aspen." Clay's parents
are physically in L.A., but emotionally absent from his life. Like all
parents in the book, they are separated. His father buys him expenThe Cresset

sive lunches and writes large checks
to his children on Christmas morning. His mother is preoccupied
with her new lover. Clay's two
younger sisters watch porno movies
on their VCR and ask him to judge
a contest to see who can pretend to
be dead the longest. Even his psychiatrist offers little help. He advises
Clay to overcome his "passiveness"
by collaborating with the analyst on
a screen play.
Clay and his group not only lack
a commitment to each other and to
their families, they also have no interest in college or learning. Nearly
all attend college, but classes,
majors, grades, and careers are
never mentioned. Most attend
U.S.C.-"the University of Spoiled
Children"-or "Jew C.L.A." They
cannot understand why Clay has
gone away to school rather than to
"stay and play in L.A." College is,
as Julian states, "totally bogus."
Education is of no relevance to
their lives. A college degree is not
the "key" to the future, as the future is of no importance.
This unconcern for the future is
accompanied by a lack of interest
in the past. Clay remembers his
past only in a few fragmented
dreams. His knowledge of history is
old rock albums by groups no
longer on MTV. Often he cannot
recall what he did the previous day
or even the past hour. Emerging
from a movie, he is asked what film
he saw. "The one in number 13" is
his only response.
Detached from the past and unconcerned with the future, the
young people in Less Than Zero
have little involvement even with
the present. Unlike the "me" generation, they do not covet "success."
Clay concludes that "you have to
work too hard to be successful."
There is a fatedness in the book.
Clay is aware that he and his colleagues are self-destructive, but is
resigned to his fate . He states the
maJor message of the book when
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he explains: "I don't want to care.
. . . Its less painful if I don't
care."
Even with Blair, Clay wants no
emotional ties. At the end of the
book she asks if he ever loved her.
Clay admits that he never did. She
persists: "Did you ever care for me
at all?" Clay is forced to say he
never did.
What can the "older generation"
conclude from this bleak and desolate view of college-age youth? Certainly Clay, Blair, Julian, and
others in Less Than Zero are not
typical. The children of movie and
TV executives, they are fabulously
wealthy. They drive Porsches, Mercedes, and Ferraris and have no
difficulty spending hundreds of
dollars a day on drugs, expensive
meals, and designer clothes. Such
affluence is hardly the mark of the
"typical" college student.
Wealth, however, is not the key
to Ellis' characters. He has captured the traits of a growing
number of college students, even
those who do not drive sportscars
and lunch at Chasen's. Nowhere in
the book do we see any hint of
the success-driven, career-oriented,
clean-cut students that the media
claim dominate the 1980s. There
are no computer science majors
reading dress for success books to
prepare them to climb the corporate ladder.
Ellis' message is that the "preYuppie" student of the 1970s and
early 1980s may be giving way to a
far different type. The goals we associate with students (the pursuit of
good grades, the drive for success,
the hope for power and fame, the
desire for "meaningful relationships") are totally unimportant to
the "zero" generation. Clay and his
peers have no interest in capitalism,
patriotism, Ronald Reagan, traditional family values, religion, or
any of the other supposed values of
the "young conservatives" on campus. Commercials tell young people

that "they can have it all," but Clay
and his friends do not want anything.
Our stereotype of the upwardlymobile student diligently planning
for the first job is shattered in Less
Than Zero. Clay has no concern for
the future and no interest in planning anything. He lacks both goals
and energy. Unlike those of the
"me generation," he is unconerned
with personal comfort and pleasure. There is little pleasure and no
comfort in Less Than Zero. Drugs
exist only for escape and expensive
clothing is merely an accepted uniform. Sex (hetero or homo) offers
no joy.
Less Than Zero may be exaggerated, but it is still a frightening description of youth in the mid1980s. If Ellis is at all correct, we
are on the verge of another "generation gap." Adults who came of age
in the 1950s or 1960s tend to view
today's students as the conservative
careerists of the 1970s. Perhaps this
image
is
becoming
obsolete.
Perhaps it is not just a case of
young people having "different"
values or the "wrong" values, but a
generation with no fixed values or
goals at all-where the only object
in life is to look good and to be left
alone.
It is tempting to dismiss Ellis' vision as inaccurate. Surely our students are not the passive moral
zombies who dominate Less Than
Zero. Such thoughts are comforting,
but the truth is likely more disturbing. We know there are few "lost
generation romantics" or "angry
radicals" in our classrooms; maybe
there are fewer "young Yuppies"
too.
Look more closely at your classes.
Look way in the back, in the
corner, and you may see Clay or
Blair or Julian. They are not the
ones frantically scribbling notes to
insure a high grade on the next
exam. They are the ones staring at
you.
~~
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So Long, Summer
Dot Nuechterlein
How was your summer? Mine
was quite successful. Successful,
that is, in the sense that I nearly
managed to avoid going anywhere
near a swimming area of any type,
dressed to participate.
Now I realize that millions of
people-no, probably billions of
you-dearly love to swim. That is a
very good reason to go swimming,
of course, but it just doesn't happen to apply to me.
There is a near-tragic reason for
my wariness of water: I once nearly
drowned. I grew up in an area
where lakes and pools were few
and an era when swimming lessons
were not taken for granted, so I
never learned water survival skills.
The accident happened at age
fifteen when I wanted to be part of
the gang and got in over my head.
Apparently my boyfriend nearly
drowned, too, walking on the bottom of the lake holding me up. My
life didn't pass before me, but the
pearly gates sure did. I have since
tried to force myself to learn the
strokes, but an unconquerable fear
remains, and it is just not much
fun. If I can't touch bottom or
reach out and grab something stationary, fright gives way to terror
and panic. It isn't worth it.
Exercise IS another excellent
reason for going swimming, but except for water aerobics or other
such stay-put movements, you have
to be able to swim before reaping
any fitness benefits, so count me
out.
Still another reason why people
enjoy swimming in the summer is
to work on their tans. Some, in
fact, do not actually enter the water
at all, but lie on the beach or pool32

side turning bronze.
Unfortunately that motivation
doesn't fit me either. In my
younger days I conscientiously
worked at the slather-with-oil-bakein-the-sun routine, but I have
never in my life turned bronze, or
any one of the other gorgeous colors. Outrageous orange, of course.
Repugnant red, right. Peeling pink,
perpetually. But beautiful bronze?
Never.
So now I avoid direct sunshine as
much as possible and try to remain
my pale and wan self. Too much
sun, you know, turns skin to wrinkled leather and makes straw out of
hair. So there.

There's no doubt but
what awe
and fantasy this
..,.
bod does not inspire.

.,

Another factor bringing bodies
to the beach is so that people can
show off how good they look in
swim suits. Uh, probably we should
not even discuss this one. My primary problem here is that, as I recently mentioned to a friend, the
cycles of my life have fit the
greater culture in a backwards
manner.
As a teenager I was boyish-looking and underweight-just when
the ideal female form belonged to
a lady named Marilyn Monroe.
When I grew up (and around) and
started looking more womanly,
guess who was considered perfection? Twiggy. And now that I have
settled into middle age and beyond,
we are all supposed to look like
Heather Locklear (good grief) or
Jane Fonda (even gooder grief,
since Jane is almost exactly my
age).
Now I do not belong to the Joan
Rivers School of Self-Flagellation; I
firmly believe we should pay as little attention as possible to our
poorer points and focus instead on
our more admirable traits. But

facts is facts, as someone once remarked, and there is no doubt but
what awe and fantasy this bod does
not inspire. So I normally prefer
not to parade it around much in
the bits of fabric that are
euphemistically referred to as bathing "suits."
Once when I was in a fancyclancy department store I happened to stumble into one of those
exclusive sections devoted to the
well-endowed dowagers of high society. "Hey," I thought to myself,
"why don't we pretend we are one
of the filthy rich and see what kind
of swimwear can transform what
kind of figure faults when money is
no object." Alas. Svelte, I discovered after an hour of trying on
their entire stock, cannot be purchased at any price. Might as well
stick with my little old, that is to say
ancient, $10.98 Sears number.
Lest you think I never ever dip
toe into water let me say that there
is one other reason that comes to
mind why anyone might want to go
swimming, and this one includes
yours truly. Sometimes it is simply
an aspect of being sociable, of taking part in ordinary, everyday life.
I still try to be part of the gang,
when the appropriate occasion
calls. If you invite me to a swimming party I will come-just so
long as you don't expect me to actually swim. Back when I was a
youth worker, days at the beach
were a regular part of the annual
program; I just never tried to play
lifeguard. When my children were
small I took them to the pool and
paid for some lessons so that they
would not be affected by my
phobia.
Looking at water is fine; listening
to sea or lake or waterfall can be
wonderful; but I have learned that
being in or on or under water can
be hazardous to your health, and I
will always find my fun and adventure in other activities, thank you
~~
anyway.
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